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3INTRODUCTION
Since Arrow’s (1963) seminal paper, interest in the economic aspect of health
issues and in economists’ opinion about how to deal with problems related to health and
the health care sector has strongly grown. Arrow’s paper announced the entry of health
economics as a new discipline and became one of the most widely cited articles in the field
of health economics. Today, health is considered one of the most valuable personal and
universal rights:
[The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the funda-
mental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political
belief, economic or social condition.],
as stated in the preamble to the World Health Organization (WHO) Constitution;
the determinants of health and health inequalities have became two issues of vital impor-
tance to health policy in establishing the extent to which the eﬀect of various non-medical
inputs such as income, education, social position, age, ethnicity, health-related behaviors
and environmental quality contribute to modify the individual health status.
Grossman’s (1972) contribution was the first formal economic model of the deter-
minants of health and represented the first relevant theoretical and empirical work after
Arrow’s theoretical approach. Treating health as endogenous was a major diﬀerence be-
tween Grossman’s model and the health models that preceded it. Drawing on the theory
of human capital formulated by Becker (1965), Grossman constructed a model where in-
dividuals use medical care and their own time to produce health. Grossman interpreted
a person’s health as a capital stock that exogenously deteriorates at an increasing rate
with age. To counteract this health deterioration, he assumed that individuals invest a
4portion of their assets into health production each period. Hence, he did not consider
individuals’ health status as totally exogenous but as dependent, at least in part, on the
resources allocated to its production.
In the last decades there has been increasing concerns about the possible adverse
impact of pollution on human health. Public awareness on environmental health issues
and their important economic repercussions has led to a pattern of substantial literature
development on theoretical and empirical aspects of the economic valuation of environment-
related health costs with the aim of promoting policies to improve environmental quality
and human health.
The health production approach, first introduced by Grossman, has been success-
fully employed in the evaluation of health pollution related damages: subsequent contri-
butions to Grossman’s paper, by analyzing the decisions consumers make concerning the
resources allocated to health production, tried to infer the value of health to the consumers
and derived and estimated econometrically a measure of individual willingness to pay for
a reduction in pollution (Gerking and Stanley, 1986; Cropper, 1981; Dixie and Gerking,
1991). An important contribution in this area was Cropper (1981). Cropper presented
a simple model of preventive health care, similar to that of Grossman (1972). She takes
changes in environmental conditions to influence the rate at which an individual’s stock of
health depreciates and used her model to define what a person would pay for a change in
air quality.
The health production function approach is one of the several methodologies that
environmental and health economists have developed to measure the value of pollution
5health related damages. In the first chapter of our work, we critically review these meth-
ods and the research eﬀorts that have been devoted to estimating pollution health re-
lated impacts. First, starting with Weitzman’s (1974) seminal paper, we provide a short
but comprehensive overview of the key literature on the choices faced by policy makers
concerning price-based versus quantity-based instruments to regulate pollution and protect
human health; then, we review the methods employed in estimating pollution abatement
costs and pollution related health damages whose comparison (with reference to Weitzman’s
theoretical rule) form the basis for the choice among the price-based and quantity-based
regulation instruments.
The aim of chapter 1 is to shed light on the issue concerning the diﬃculties that the
analysts face in estimating the value of (marginal) pollution health damages or (marginal)
benefits from reduced pollution. In fact, while measuring control costs seems relatively
straightforward (market exists in principle in which pollution control equipment can be
bought, and such equipment will reduce pollution by measurable levels), health damages
(or benefits) are much harder to measure. First, analysts should accurately measure the
health eﬀects of pollution. Once they have determined those eﬀects, they have to put a
monetary value on them. However, valuing health is obviously controversial because each
person may place a diﬀerent value on it.
In 1977, Lave and Seskin published a pioneering work on the physical relationship
between air pollution and health. Their analysis was conducted on aggregate data. The
big problem with these data was that they did not allow to consider the influence of indi-
vidual’s specific choices (nutrition behavior, sport activities, smoking and alcohol habits,
6sleeping, housing conditions etc.) and other several important factors. Moreover, the eﬀects
on health will also vary across individuals due to the so called ”confounding factors”: genet-
ics, avoidance behavior, life-style, socioeconomic status. Hence, analysts have to calculate
associated changes in health outcomes by taking into account that pollution could easily be
correlated with other factors that may be just as influential. Based on this insight, in the
second chapter when analyzing the relationship between air pollution and health, we control
for socioeconomic variables and other important individual characteristics; in particular we
control for life-style variables since individuals specific behavior represents another crucial
determinant of the risk of illness. The analysis is focussed on how individual health habits
and outdoor air quality combine to aﬀect the likelihood of a good or bad health status, in a
second-best world characterized by uncertainty on the level of health, where an individual
may not able to avoid adverse health shocks completely. The framework is built on the
basic concepts and ideas of the demand for health by Grossman (1972) and the subsequent
contribution by Cropper (1981).
Following Grossman (1972) and Cropper (1981), we construct a model of health
accumulation in which we assume that health depreciates at an increasing rate with age
and ambient air pollution. The main diﬀerences with respect to Grossman and Cropper’
models are that the level of health is uncertain and, for individuals who suﬀer or have
suﬀered from a pathological condition, illness enters directly the rate of health depreciation
too. As in Cropper’s (1981) model, we assume that when pollution increases it becomes
more costly to reduce the probability of suﬀering from health shocks. Individuals feel less
healthy because they perceive health depreciation rate to be higher. Hence, they may
7choose to invest less in their health and maintain lower health stock because of the higher
net investment costs. In this sense, a higher pollution concentration may have two eﬀects
on health: a direct eﬀect which consists of an increase of natural rate of depreciation,
and an indirect eﬀect, described by Cropper (1981), by which individuals will invest less in
health and display a higher probability of suﬀering from health shocks. We will analyze this
aspect in section 4 of this chapter focusing on the relationship between increasing pollution
and health investment decisions. In addition we will examine whether chronic illnesses, by
altering the rate to which health capital stock deteriorates, have any influence on individual
health investment decisions too.
To estimate the health accumulation model and investigate the relation between
health status, pollution, and health investment decisions, we use three diﬀerent measures
of overall health: dichotomous measures of blood pressure and functional limitations and
disability are employed; moreover we take, as an indicator of health, a self-assessed health
measure that is common in empirical research (Contoyannis and Jones, 2004, Balia and
Jones, 2004 etc.). Since we have included life-style variable as regressors in the health equa-
tion a problem of simultaneity may arise. Hence we try to corrected the potential endogene-
ity of the behavioral variables by using a recursive multivariate probit model (Contoyannis
and Jones, 2004; Blaylock and Blisard, 1992).
The model is estimated using data based on the 2001 Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System, which however does not measure environmental quality; environmental
information at metropolitan area-level is available from EPA and can be used in conjunction
with BRFSS data to compare measures of environmental quality and health. Data are
8merged at the metropolitan area-level which is available in both the BRFSS and EPA data.
In chapter 2, we concentrate our attention on one of the main worldwide sources
of air pollution: motor vehicle emissions. The most important standard concerning motor
vehicles pollution is carbon monoxide. CO air concentration is generally high in areas
with heavy traﬃc congestion therefore we consider carbon monoxide as a proxy for vehicle
emissions (U.S., EPA 2000)
According to our results, a higher concentration of carbon monoxide has respec-
tively a negative impact on the probability of enjoying good health and a positive influence
on healthy habits. Then, concerning vehicular air pollution our results do not support
Cropper’s (1981) model: people living in polluted areas tend to invest more in health prob-
ably to counteract to the deterioration of a higher depreciation rate due to an increasing
pollution. Arguably, people lead a healthy life-style to increase their health stock and build
up resistance against pollution symptoms and future damages.
Grossman’s model has become a cornerstone in the field of health economics.
The model, however, is not undisputed. A key criticism has been that it fails to take into
account the uncertainty on the future health status and the uncertainty on the returns from
investments in health production. By investing in health, individuals do not determine with
certainty their health status: environment and chance are two factors which may interfere.
Grossman’s model, however, did not account for uncertainty as it included neither explicit
acknowledgment of uncertainty nor the description of illness, even though the fundamental
relationship between health and uncertainty was established by economic theory (Arrow,
1963). Because of uncertainty, much of an individual’s demand for health care is not
9steady, but irregular and unpredictable. This implies that the costs of health care act as
a random deduction from an individual’s income. Therefore, under uncertainty, risk-averse
individuals demand risk-bearing goods, such as health insurance, to safeguard their income
against possible shocks (Cagatay, 2004).
It is well known, however, that health insurance coverage reducing an individual’s
marginal cost of medical care inputs, leads to use additional medical services: an insured
individual, in fact, may consume more medical services and have a greater expenditure
compared to an uninsured one (moral hazard eﬀect, Leibowitz, 2004). Hence, health insur-
ance biases health production decisions toward over-use of curative medical treatment at
the expense of one’s own preventive eﬀorts.
Insurance choice itself may be aﬀected by planned medical expenditure and ex-
pectations about medical care utilization (adverse selection eﬀect). Chapter 3 focuses in
particular on this last eﬀect. In health insurance market, adverse selection may occur when
consumers’ true health-cost risk is private information: insurance companies may know that
consumers vary in the level of risk, but, in principle, are not able to discern who are high
and who are low risk profile individuals within a group of potential insured. (Akerlof, 1970;
Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). Identifying risks accurately is not an easy task and requires
that insurance company incurs some costs. Insured parties are heterogeneous in terms of
expected costs and have more information about their risks. Naturally, high-risk individu-
als are not encouraged to “reveal” their risk to the insurance company; this asymmetry is
a serious problem since may lead insurance company to face large diﬀerences in expected
health costs due to heterogeneity in demographics and the incidence of illness.
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In spite of the extensive theoretical interest on the adverse selection, there is little
empirical evidence on the extent of the problem. The goal of the third chapter is to test
empirically for adverse selection in the U.S. health insurance market. The test is based
on the 2003/2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey — Household Component (MEPS-HC)
data used in conjunction with the previous year’s National Health Interview Survey (NHIS)
data. The exercise is conducted by estimating the correlation between the completeness of
insurance an individual buys and his ex-post risk experience, conditional on the observable
characteristics which are used in pricing insurance policies.
Completeness of health insurance plan is measured by health insurance reimburse-
ment that is the diﬀerence between total health expenditure and out-of-pocket expenditure
on health care paid by consumers. Health insurance reimbursement, however, is only de-
fined for a subset of individuals from the overall population since we observe it only for
those who participate in insurance and face positive health care expenditure. Thus, the
model may suﬀer from sample selection bias and straightforward regression analysis may
lead to inconsistent parameters estimate. Another problem that arises from the estimation
is the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the equations of interest. In most of the
studies which test for adverse selection two important estimation issues such as unobserved
heterogeneity and selection bias, are traditionally treated separately. In our model, we
control for selection bias and at the same time for unobserved heterogeneity issue by using
Wooldridge (1995) two-step estimation procedure. We extend this estimation method to the
case in which selectivity is due to two sources rather than one (participation in insurance
and participation in health care expenditure).
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We find no systematic relation between illness of individuals and insurance choice.
We think that a possible explanation can be found in the so called ”cream skimming”
practise: health plans may have an incentive to alter their policy to attract the healthy
and repeal the sick (Newhouse, 1996; Ellis, 1997). Then, insurers may practice a kind of
”reverse adverse selection”: they would try attempt to increase their profits by refusing to
write policies for the worst risks in an insurance pool (see Siegelman, 2004 ). This strategic
behavior can take a variety of forms including: designing insurance benefits packages in
such a way as to be more attractive to healthy persons than unhealthy one for instance
by excluding particular prescription drugs, oﬀering numerous pediatrician ( families with
children are better risks) or by excluding cancer specialist visits. In such cases health plan
may also refuse to sell an applicant insurance altogether. If health plans cream healthy
individuals, those who are enrolled in health insurance are relatively healthy people and
this lead to the failure of the correlation test.
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Chapter 1
From Theory to Implementation of
the Best Policy Instrument to
Protect Human Health: a Brief
Overview
1.1 Pollution Regulation to Protect Human Health
Human health problems related to environmental degradation and use of natural
resources are potentially serious in many parts of the developed and developing world alike.
These problems may have important economic repercussions: they may generate additional
costs for patients and the social welfare system, they can lead to a loss of productivity
and profits for firms and they often result in a loss of income for individuals. Then, im-
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proving human health through measures addressed at preventing or reducing environmental
pollution is a very important task for policy makers and government intervention through
regulation is necessary to control pollution.
[...there are to many people damaged by most emissions of pollution for them
to act as a single coordinated agent. Victims of pollution damages have diﬀerent
tastes, incomes, education so that they cannot agree how much to control pol-
lution. (This justifies) government intervention in absence of which the market
would fail to abate emissions...] (Mendelsohn, 2002).
Government intervention to protect human health means regulations through stan-
dards or other mechanisms of pollution control. In the last decades, much of the debate on
instruments for government regulation has centered on the use of market-based incentives
(MBI) mechanisms as opposed to command and control approaches (CAC). In CAC regu-
latory mechanism, the regulator usually specifies a technology or emission standards with
the aim of controlling the substances that can contribute to pollution (Ellerman, 2005).
The problem with CAC mechanisms is that they do not abate pollution eﬃciently. The
marginal cost of control is high for some firms and low for others, since a such as uniform
regulations treat all firms the same way. Moreover, command and control approaches do
not encourage polluters to do any better than the law demands (Gangadharan and Duke,
2001).
Among economists there is near unanimity in preferring market-based incentives
since they encourage firms to abate pollution more eﬃciently. Among MBIs, the basic choice
faced by policy makers concerns price-based versus quantity-based instruments, or in other
14
words, pollution taxes1 and tradeable permits2. To establish a basis for comparison among
these policy instruments, the traditional literature often relies on the following assumptions:
- the same amount of emissions from diﬀerent sources have equal external costs;
- the literature ignores possible interactions with other markets;
- there is no uncertainty about the costs and the benefits of pollution control;
- a competitive structure prevails.
In this setting, it is easy to show that emission taxes and tradable permits are
equivalent: the two approaches will lead to the same outcome that is the optimal level of
emissions at minimum cost. In a world of perfect knowledge, marketable permits are in
principle a fully equivalent alternative to unit taxes. Instead of setting the proper tax and
obtaining the eﬃcient quantity of emissions as a result, regulator could issue emissions per-
mits. This symmetry between taxes and tradable permits, however, is critically dependent
upon the assumption of perfect knowledge. In a setting of imperfect information concerning
the marginal benefit and cost function, the outcomes under the two approaches can diﬀer
in important ways. When there is uncertainty either about the marginal benefits and the
marginal costs the optimal level of emissions will typically not be achieved, and the goal of
regulator than becomes to minimize eﬃciency losses (Cropper and Oates, 1992).
1The concept of pollution tax was developed by the British economist Arthur Pigou, in “The Economics
of Welfare” (1920). The term pollution taxes otherwise known as externality taxes or Pigouvian taxes, by
definition refers to a tax used to correct the misallocation of estimated damage.
2The term tradable permit was developed in the pioneering work of Dales (1968). Dales proposed a
market of tradable permits as solution to pollution problems in which the government grants pollution
rights, that should be tradable for a certain period , and in which government acts as broker for the trade
monitoring the system.
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The choice between quantity regulation and price regulation in terms of economic
eﬃciency under imperfect information has been shown repeatedly in the pollution control
literature. The classic article in this area is Weitzman (1974)3. He assumed linear marginal
costs and uncertainty about the level of the marginal costs and benefits (not their slopes).
Under these assumptions he reaches four main conclusions. Firstly, under full information
it does not matter whether taxes or individual permits are used. Both instruments secure a
first best optimum. Secondly, an error in estimating the benefits function has adverse eﬀects
on welfare but does not favor one policy instrument over the other: the eﬃciency losses will
be exactly the same for the emission tax as the tradable permits system. Thirdly, if there is
uncertainty about costs, emission tax is preferred over quantity regulation if the marginal
costs are steeper than the marginal benefits function. Finally, transferable permits are
preferred over taxes in the case of imperfect information about costs if the marginal benefits
function is steeper than the marginal costs function. These results can be summarized as
follows:
5 ≈ σ
2
C (B” + C”)
2C”2
(1.1)
where 5 denotes the relative advantage of taxes over tradable permits measured in terms
of welfare. If 5 > 0 taxes are preferred over quantities regulation; while 5 < 0 implies
that tradeable permits is preferred over taxes. B” denotes the marginal benefits slope (with
B” > 0) while C” denotes the curvature of marginal cost ( with C” > 0). σ2C represents the
uncertainty on the cost function4, while the sign ≈ is used to denote ”a local approximation”
3Weitzman did not prescribe exact types of price or quantity instruments, but many authors see the issue
as binary choice problem between taxes and a quantity-based regime of tradeable permits.
4The regulator perceives the cost function only as an estimate or approximation: C(q, θ) where q denotes
the emissions reduction and θ is a disturbance term or a random variable. σ2C denotes the variance of
costs; as σ2C shrinks to zero we move closer to the perfect certainty case where in theory the two pollution
16
in the traditional Taylor theorem sense.
Subsequent contributions to this topic fall into two categories:
- Modifying the assumptions in Weitzman’s analysis (see Weitzman and Laﬀont, 1977;
Malcomson,1978; Stavins, 1996; Stranlund and Ben-Haim, 20075)
- Comparing policy tools other than an emission taxes and tradeable permits ( see Yohe,
1977; Baumol and Oates, 1988; Mckitrick, 1997; Williams, 2000; Montero, 2004).
Weitzman stresses that if the uncertainty on benefit and the uncertainty on cost
function are simultaneously present and benefit and cost function are not independently
distributed, the correct form of the above rule becomes:
5 ≈ σ
2
C (B” + C”)
2C”2
− σBC
C”
(1.2)
where σBC represents the covariance between benefits and costs. In order to explore the
full implications of the above rule, Stavins (1996) rewrite equation (1.2) as:
5 ≈ σ
2
C
C”
µ
B”
2C”
+
1
2
− ρBC
σC
σB
¶
(1.3)
where ρBC is the correlation coeﬃcient between benefits and costs, while σB and σC are
respectively the standard deviation of benefits and costs. Based on the equation (1.3)
Stevins made the following important observations:
regulation mechanisms perform equally satisfactorily.
5Weitzman and Laﬀont (1977) examine modifications to the relative-slopes criterion when these are
also uncertain. Malcomson (1978) reexamine Weitzman’s rule when local linear approximations to the
benefits and costs function are not appropriate. Stanlund and Ben-Haim (2007) revisit Weitzman’s original
work under Knightian uncertainty that is when uncertainty cannot be modelled with known moments of
probability distribution.
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1. when benefits and costs are not correlated, so that ρBC = 0, an error in estimating
the benefit function has adverse eﬀects on the welfare, but the welfare loss does not
diﬀer under taxes and tradable permits regime;
2. Given
∂5
∂ (σB · σC) = −
ρBC
C”
, a positive correlation between benefits and costs tends to
favor tradeable permits over taxes while a positive correlation tends to favor emission
taxes.
3. Given
∂5
∂ρBC
= −σBσC
C”
, the greater the benefit or the cost uncertainty and the lesser
is the slope of the marginal cost function and the greater is the influence of the
correlation among benefits and costs on the choice of the the best policy instrument
to regulate pollution.
4. Theoretically these eﬀects can overwhelm the usual Weitzman’s relative-slopes instru-
ment recommendation.
5. The ”instrument neutrality” identified by the equality between marginal benefits from
pollution reduction and marginal abatement costs disappears when benefits and costs
are not independently distributed; in fact by setting B” = −C” Stevins showed that:
5 = −σBC
C”
(1.4)
a positive correlation favor quantities based instruments (tradeable permits) while if
negative correlation between costs and benefits exists, price instruments would be op-
timal. Stavins presents various scenarios for statistical dependence between marginal
benefits from environmental protection and marginal abatement costs. Many sce-
narios, however, provide examples of positive correlation, suggesting that quantity
18
instruments would be more attractive than otherwise. For instance, he considered the
weather as generator of stochastic shocks that produce correlated impacts on marginal
benefits and marginal costs of pollution control:
[... the increased ultraviolet radiation that reaches the ground level on sunny
days means more ozone formation from oxides of nitrogen and volatile organic
compounds. Hence the marginal cost of ambient concentration reduction (and
risk reduction) would increase. Of course, on beautiful sunny days, people are
more likely to be outside, exercising, and breathing the ozone-laden air; hence,
the marginal benefits of ambient-reduction would also increase, yielding a positive
correlation between the relevant marginal benefits and marginal costs...] (Stavins,
1996).
Williams (2000, 2002) extends Weitzman’s (1974) paper by developing a model
of regulation of a group of pollution sources which investigates the relative eﬃciency of
three regulatory instruments when there is uncertainty in the regulators’s knowledge of
firms’ costs: an emission tax, fixed quotas and tradeable permits. The general structure is
similar to the model in Weitzman, but diﬀers in two important respects: Williams’s paper
compares three pollution regulation instruments (tradeable permits, taxes and fixed quotas),
and considers the degree of substitutability between the pollution sources. Williams results
can be summarized as follows:
5TQ = B” (1− φ) + C”
2C”
µ
N − 1
N
¶P
i
σ2iC (1.5)
where, 5TQ denotes the relative advantage of tradeable permits over fixed quotas in terms
of welfare. N denotes the number of pollution sources distinguished by location, time
period or both, while φ represents the degree of substitutability between the pollution
sources. When abatement at one location is a perfect substitute for abatement at any
other location, as in the case of globally mixed pollutants, tradable permits are preferred
19
over fixed emission quotas. However, when pollution is high localized and independent of
emissions produced by other sources, tradable permits are dominated by emission taxes or
fixed quotas.
Montero (2004) considers the optimal policy instruments choice when the regu-
lator faces several information constraints: each firms have private information about its
emissions, abatement costs and production costs. Montero develops a theoretical model for
an industry of heterogeneous firms that produce output and undesirable by-products. The
nature of Montero’s model is similar to the one in Weitzman (1974) but with important dif-
ferences: he compares the performance of two quantity instruments ( tradeable permits and
fixed standards) and considers the eﬀect of cost heterogeneity across firms on instrument
performance. He concludes that tradeable permits is preferred over CAC regulation when
cost heterogeneity across firms is large, while when heterogeneity disappears the advantage
of permits reduces in favor of standards. He also examine the advantage of a hybrid policy
that optimally combines permits and standards.
Weitzman and the above described subsequent contributions fixed the conditions
under which each of this two instruments is to be preferred to the other in a perfectly
competitive equilibrium. However, many of major polluters in the real world are large firms
in non-competitive industries (oil refineries, chemical companies, and auto manufacturers)
where firms are not price takers in their output markets. Buchanan (1969) called attention
to this issue by showing that the imposition of a Pigouvian tax may lead to a contraction
in output that under monopoly regime is below the social optimum: a tax on a polluting
monopolist will reduce the generation of external damages, but it may also cause the firm
20
to reduce further its output. Thus, there is a trade-oﬀ between the two distortions, one
due to the monopolistic underproduction and the other due to negative externalities. A tax
based only on negative externalities ignores the social cost of further output contraction by
a monopolist whose output is already below an optimal level.
Barnett (1980) was the first to solve the problem of determining the second best
optimal emission level and the corresponding second best emission tax to be imposed on
a monopolist. He considers a polluter who produces a single product output q and who
discharges smoke s generating external diseconomies E(s). He finds that a tax rate for unit
of smoke discharged which maximizes social welfare must be equal to:
T ∗ =
df (p)
dq
dq
dT
· q
∂s
∂q
dq
dT
+
∂s
∂w
dw
dT
+
dE(s)
ds
(1.6)
where f (q) is the industry demand curve, while w denotes resources devoted to smoke
treatment. He discusses two cases: one in which the only means to abate the external
diseconomies represented by smoke is reducing output , and the second case is one in which
end-of-pipe treatment is the only means of smoke abatement. In the first case, terms
involving w disappear and an optimal tax is given by:
T ∗ =
df (p)
dq
dq
dT
· q
∂s
∂q
dq
dT
+
dE(s)
ds
(1.7)
If the only means of smoke abatement is end-of-pipe treatment the polluter responds to tax
by changing w, than
dq
dT
is equal to zero and the optimal tax is given by:
T ∗ =
dE(s)
ds
(1.8)
Only in this last case market structure is not relevant. But, market structure becomes
relevant for the more general case where both w and q vary with T . Finally, Barnett
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reformulate equation 1.6 introducing the price elasticity of demand µ =
dq
df (p)
f (p)
q
and
showing explicitly its role in determining the optimal second-best taxation:
T ∗ =
−df (p)|µ|
dq
dT
∂s
∂q
dq
dT
+
∂s
∂w
dw
dT
+
dE(s)
ds
(1.9)
He derives two main conclusions:
- when polluters are perfectly competitive µ approaches infinity, and the value of the
optimal tax rate approaches marginal external damage
dE(s)
ds
.
- when polluters are imperfectly competitive µ is finite, and second best optimal tax
rate may be less than marginal external damage to achieve an optimal trade-oﬀ be-
tween the external diseconomies and the welfare loss associated with monopoly output
contraction.
The second best tax rate is equivalent to the combination of a Pigouvian emis-
sion tax and a subsidy on production, thereby correcting both distortions. Formally, the
second-best tax rate can be negative if the social damage associated to pollution is very
small compared to the distortion due to the market structure. The environmental problem
becomes less significant and the regulator sets a negative tax (i.e. a subsidy on pollution)
to induce firms to produce more.
Chen (1990) proposes another method for regulating monopolies and their produc-
tion. He assumes that the planning authority would provide to the pollutant monopolist a
subsidy equal to the expected value of the total benefit from emission reduction. The pol-
lutant monopolist chooses the abatement level which maximizes profits given the subsidy
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and its own private information on production costs. Chen compares, referring to Weitz-
man model, the abatement subsidy with two other planning mechanisms: quantity based
instruments (tradable permits), price-based instruments (emissions taxes).
He derives two expressions for the comparative advantage of the subsidy relative
to quantity based instruments and another for the comparative advantage of the subsidy
relative to price based instruments respectively:
5ST ≈ σ
2
C
2 (C”−B”)2
> 0 (1.10)
and
5SP ≈ σ
2
CB”
2
2C” (C”−B”)2
> 0 (1.11)
where 5ST and 5SP denote respectively the relative advantage of subsidy over tradeable
permits and the relative advantage of subsidy over price regulation mechanism in terms of
welfare. Not only the abatement subsidy does dominate quantity based instruments , but
also dominates price-based instruments. Chen concludes that we have the best mechanism
when pollutant monopolist chooses the level of reduction in emission receiving, or inter-
nalizing the social benefits of his abatement. Subsidies however are often politically and
financially infeasible and might deter the adoption of new abatement technology.
Instead, little work has been done to investigate emissions trading markets where
one or more participants have market power. Much work has been done on tradeable permits
as mechanisms that may themselves influence the market structure since they may be more
susceptible to strategic behavior. The basic idea for the tradeable permits control is that
firms will trade quotas among themselves; such trading could continue until firms have equal
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marginal abatement costs and there is no further incentive to trade. In equilibrium, the
price in such market should be equal to marginal abatement costs of each of the firms. In
practice, however, the transactions costs in the market for permits might be high and this
might reduce the number of transactions and prevent marginal abatement costs from being
fully equalized. It is also possible that firms could behave in an anticompetitive fashion,
for example hoarding permits in eﬀort to drive polluting competitors out of business. (see
Hahn, 1984; Misiolek and Elder, 1989; Mansur, 2006).
1.2 Implementation of Environmental Policy
While the theoretical literature has clarified the issue concerning the determination
of the best policy instrument to regulate pollution and reduce health pollution related
damages, there has been less empirical work (see Kolstad, 19866; and Choi and Feinerman,
1995). Lack of appropriate data (as well as empirical research evidence) makes it diﬃcult
to quantify environmental health impacts and pollution social costs; hence, the choice of
environmental instruments becomes more complicated than what would appear from the
theoretical results7.
6Kolstad (1986) was the first that empirically examined the fees vs. permits issue. He evaluated policies
to control sulphur emissions from power plants by creating a stochastic model of regulatory design and
industrial response for taxes and permits for air pollution regulation. He found that if marginal benefits
from reduced sulphur emissions were constant a price instrument would be slightly preferable, but that a
slight marginal benefits slope would be enough to make permits the more desirable option.
7As to the environmental charges and taxes, for example, the lack of information on the damage levels
and problems related to their measurement constitute serious obstacles to the practical implementation.
Consider, for instance, taxes paid by road transport: in addition to the morbidity and mortality caused by
vehicular emissions, road traﬃc leads to noise stress, loss of quality of life, water pollution etc. Often, road
traﬃc damage is greater than the additional tax paid by road transport. Then, road transport may not
pay for the social costs it generates. This may lead to a pattern of transport development which may be
accompanied by excessive impacts on the environment and health.
In response to these measurement obstacles, the literature has explored some second-best approaches to
policy designs which have appealing properties. Baumol and Oates developed the “environmental charges
and standards approach” in “The Theory of Environmental Policy”. They suggested to first set a certain
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One of the explanations for the gap in the empirical literature can be found in
the diﬃculties that analysts encounter in estimating marginal pollution health damages
or marginal benefits from reduced pollution. In fact, while measuring control costs is rel-
atively straightforward (market exists in principle in which pollution control equipment
can be bought, and such equipment will reduce pollution by measurable levels 8), health
damages caused by an increase of ambient pollution or marginal benefits from a reduction
in pollution concentration are much harder to measure. Many diﬃculties derive from the
fact that individuals have diﬀerent susceptibilities toward pollution: the eﬀects on health
will vary across individuals due to genetics, avoidance behavior, life-style and other several
factors. Hence, quantify exactly the extent of the health damages or health benefits de-
riving from increasing or decreasing pollution is a very hard task: we have to calculate the
associated changes in health outcomes by taking into account that pollution could easily be
correlated with other factors that may be just as potent. Once we have determined health
pollution damages or pollution abatement benefits, we have to put a monetary value on
standard of pollution (emission, air and water quality, etc.) and then, through a process of trial and error,
derive which level of taxes have proved to give certain outputs. Taxes would be set to achieve a certain
acceptable standard rather than being based on the “unknown value of marginal damage”. They further
argued that such an approach would not result in Pareto optimality but that the
[..use of unit taxes to achieve specified quality standard is the least-cost method for the
achievement of these targets...] Baumol and Oates (1988).
The regulator can also move towards the use of voluntary approach. The regulator oﬀers the firm a
contract based on a certain level of abatement eﬀort to achieve a certain standard of pollution and the firm
can accept or refuse; if firm refuses, the regulator will impose an emission charge that is a fee levied on
each unit of pollutant emitted. The emission charge is not a Pigouvian tax strictly speaking; it is not based
on the estimated damage, but it can be considered a legitimate interpretation of the Pigouvian concept as
it is a tax implemented to combat environmental pollution circumventing the problem of the damage level
measurement.
8In order to compute and to evaluate producers’ marginal abatement costs, we should to calculate shadow
prices of pollution from the production technology that can be derived from the estimated output distance
function (Shepherd,1970; Fa¨re et al., 1993; Fa¨re et al., 1997). Shadow prices derived from estimated output
distance function do not directly reflect the value of abatement to society in terms of reduced morbidity but
they could be compared to independent calculations of such marginal benefits in order to guide regulatory
policy.
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them. However,
[...valuing health is obviously controversial because each person may place
a diﬀerent value on health. The problem facing society with pollution control
is that we must make decisions that are not specific to each person but rather
apply to us all. It is therefore not surprising that there is such controversy about
picking a single value for health...] (Mendelsohn, 2002).
Concerning the quantification of health impacts scientists have performed several
epidemiological studies on the linkages between air pollution and human health and have
used the air pollution dose-response function9 to estimate and evaluate the eﬀects of a
change in environmental quality on health10. Ostro (1994) presented the estimated health
9The dose-response function relates health eﬀects to air pollution concentrations and other factors aﬀect-
ing health.
10Many of these epidemiological studies has been conducted in developed countries and used to estimate
the eﬀects of air pollution on health in developing countries.
Ostro (1994), for instance, uses the available epidemiology literature dose-response functions from the
United States, Canada and Britain, to estimate the health impacts of conventional air pollutants (partic-
ulate matter, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, ozone) and emissions of lead in Jakarta, Indonesia. Health
eﬀects of air pollutants (such as premature mortality, hospital visits and admissions, emergency room visits,
restrictions in activity, acute respiratory symptoms, acute bronchitis in children, asthma attacks, IQ loss,
and blood pressure changes.) are estimated by applying these functions to ambient air pollution leave.
Alberini and Krupnick (1997) use daily records from a diary-type epidemiologic study in Taiwan to fit
logit equations predicting the probability of experiencing acute respiratory symptoms (and headaches) as a
function of pollution and weather variables, individual characteristics, and health background and proxies for
reporting eﬀects. They find that the rate at which illnesses are reported follows the fluctuations in PM levels
but remains unaﬀected by ozone concentrations. Their model predicts that the impact of the particulate
matter eﬀects is very small. Moreover, illness rates tend to be poorly predicted when the corresponding
equation estimated for a similar study conducted in Los Angeles is used.
Alberini and Krupnick study stresses that great care must be taken in the application of these method
since dose-response transfer might give very misleading results. Firstly, elderly are more sensitive to the
life-shortening eﬀects of air pollution and in particular to particulate matter. Extrapolations from the
U. S. population to a population with a much younger age structure would likely lead to an overestimate
of the eﬀect of pollution on premature mortality (Cropper, et al., 1997). Secondly, measured particulate
matter is a heterogeneous mixture of solids and liquid. Diﬀerences in the physical and chemical composition
of particulate matter could lead to quite diﬀerent relationships between measures of particulates and the
health eﬀects of concern across countries (Ostro, et al., 1996).
[...this approach neglects diﬀerences between the United States (and other developed coun-
tries) and the target country in pollution levels, baseline health, the age distribution of the
population, medical care systems, sickleave policies, and cultural factors that might aﬀect per-
ceptions of illness and pollution and behavioral responses...] (Alberini and Krupnick, 1997).
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impact, for a given type of health risk, as follows:
dHi = b · POPi · dA (1.12)
where: dHi denotes change in population health risk, bi denotes the slope from dose-response
curve11, POPi is population at risk, dA denotes the change in air pollution. To complete the
benefit or damage estimation for health eﬀects, one would calculate the economic valuation
Vi of this eﬀect as well. Therefore the total change of the social value (dT ) of the health
eﬀects due to the change in environmental quality under consideration can be represented
by:
dT =
P
i
VidHi (1.13)
Even assuming that we can accurately measure health eﬀects dHi, putting monetary
values Vi on that eﬀects is rarely easy. The ability to place a monetary value on the
consequences of pollution on health remains the crucial problem of the economic approach
to human health problem related to environmental degradation (Hanemann, 1994).
Environmental economists have developed methodologies to measure the value of
pollution health damages; these methods can be grouped in two broad categories. The first
includes methods that measure only the loss of direct income (lost wages and additional
expenditures). These approaches do not include discomfort, pain, losses in leisure, and
other less-tangible impacts to individual and family well-being, moreover, may seriously
understate or completely ignore the health costs of people who are not members of the
labor force. Therefore, these methods provide only the lower bound of the social costs
since tend to understate the total costs to individuals. The second category is based on the
11The slope of dose-response function measures the percentage change in the health outcome for a one
unit change in ambient air pollution level.
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willingness to pay (WTP) of some economic agents for avoiding pollution health damages.
Willingness to pay reflects the individual’s preferences and can be interpreted as a monetary
measure of health damage.
In addition, following the conventional economic practice, we distinguish these
methodologies on the basis of whether their primary focus concerns respectively nonfatal
illness or rather death (or more specifically the change in the conditional probability of
dying at each age, for an identified group of individuals at risk).
1.2.1 The Economic Value of Morbidity
Models that describe what an individual would pay to avoid illness associated
to pollution are, by now, well established in the literature (Berger et al. 1987; Harrington
and Portney, 1987; Cropper and Freeman, 1991). We start by sketching Berger et al.’s
(1987) model in order to provide a framework for interpreting individuals’ willingness to
pay. Then, we critically review the methods and the research eﬀorts that have been devoted
to estimating the willingness to pay for reduced morbidity (see also Dickie and Gerking,
2002).
Berger et al. (1987), assume that a person’s utility depends on the consumption
of goods and services and the state of health:
U = U(c, q) (1.14)
where U is utility, C is consumption and q is a vector of health characteristics. Individuals,
however, do not know their health status with certainty . The probability of enjoying good
health is influenced by choosing one’s life-style, thus making better and worse health status
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more or less probable, and by using medical advice, pharmaceuticals, hospital treatment,
etc. Although one’s current health status certainly provides some information about the
likelihood of future health outcomes, the risk of getting a disease may also depend on other
factors such as pollution exposure, smoking history, which are more or less independent
of one’s observable health state. Berger et al. (1987) assume that the probability density
function for health status is:
h (q;X,E) (1.15)
where X is preventive expenditure and E is any exogenous shift such as environmental
quality change. They reasonable assume that the chances of survival can be expressed as
function of health characteristics:
p = p (q) (1.16)
In addition, they assume that health is a matter only of absence or presence of a deleterious
condition and the density function h (q;X,E) is discrete rather than continuos, with q = 1
if individuals will enjoy good health and q = 0 otherwise, thus:
h (q;X,E) = H (X,E) if q = 0
h (q;X,E) = (1−H (X,E) ) if q = 1
(1.17)
where H (X,E) denotes the probability of contracting the disease. Berger et al. (1987) as-
sume that a person will choose preventive expenditure X in order to maximize the expected
value of utility:
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max E (U) = U0P0 (1−H) + U1P1H
subject to M = C +X + Z
(1.18)
where M is the income, U0 = U (M −X, 0) is the utility if free of the disease; U0 =
U (M −X − Z, 1) is the utility with the disease (where Z is the cost of illness that re-
duces consumption without providing utility). P0 denotes the probability of survival if the
individual is free from disease while P1 denotes the probability of survival with disease.
From the above maximization problem Berger et al. (1987) derive a person’s
WTP for an exogenous reduction of the concentration of pollution. WTP can be defined
as a change in income that would be required to keep the expected utility constant when
there is an exogenous change. Berger et al. express WTP as sum of two terms:
−dM/dE = − [(U0P0 − U1P1) /λ] (dH/dE)− (dX/dE) (1.19)
the first term is the monetary value of the expected diﬀerences of the expected utilities
between being healthy and ill by the change in health risk. The second term denotes the
change in preventive expenditure due to an exogenous change in the environment. Finally,
λ = U 00P0 (1−H) + U 01P1H and can be interpreted as the marginal utility of income.
Referring to the model above, Berger et al. (1987) explore two techniques aimed
at measuring WTP: the cost-of- illness (COI) approach and the preventive expenditures (or
averting expenditure ) approach, that we review below.
The cost-of- illness (COI) approach is often used to value the cost of pollution re-
lated to morbidity. COI measures any loss of earnings resulting from illness (direct costs),
medical costs such as for doctors, hospital visits or days, and medication, and any other re-
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lated out-of-pocket expenses (indirect costs) (see Hodgson and Meiners,1982 for a complete
description of the methodology).
A key criticism to COI approach has been that it fails to take into account
individuals’ preferences, disutility from illness (Harrington and Portney, 1987), averting
behavior and averting expenditure (Cournat and Porter, 1981). This criticism is supported
by the equation 1.19 that consists in two terms: a utility term which reflects the cost of
illness and a second term reflecting preventive expenditure. Only if preventive expenditure
does not exist or does not change with changes in environment (dX/dE = 0) or, in a less
plausible case, if health status does not aﬀect directly the individual utility function, equa-
tion 1.19 collapses to the first term and COI can be considered a measure of individuals’
WTP.
In a similar model to the one presented above, Cropper and Freeman (1991) show
that willingness to pay can be expressed as the product of the slope of a dose-response
relationship times the marginal value of illness. But, since the marginal value of illness
includes not only the loss in productivity and out-of-pocket expenditure but also pain and
suﬀering, defensive expenditure, and loss in leisure time, it is likely to be higher than the
COI measure. Hence, COI gives only a lower bound on willingness to pay (see also Dickie
and Gerking, 2002).
The preventive expenditures (or averting expenditure) approach assumes that the
link between environmental quality and health damages is aﬀected by many human choices.
In Berger et al. (1987) these choices are represented by consumption of X, which can be
defined in several ways such as: whether to exercise on a day with high ozone level or to
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install an air filter or to buy bottled water. The preventive expenditure approach infers
the minimum amount people are willing to pay to reduce health risks through the amounts
people living in polluted areas spend on averting measures: for instance, expenditures on
air filters or bottled water can be used to infer the minimum value people are willing to pay
to avoid respectively respiratory or waterborne diseases. This approach has received little
attention in environmental literature since it presents many limitations (see Courant and
Porter,1981). Firstly, referring again to the equation 1.19, we can observe that preventive
expenditure represents only a lower bound of and individual’s WTP since it does not con-
sider explicitly the cost of illness. In addition, averting measures may be diﬃcult to define
for diﬀerent types of pollution.
Abdalla et al. (1992) use the averting expenditure method for valuing environ-
mental improvements and for approximating the economic costs of groundwater degrada-
tion to households in a southeastern Pennsylvania community. The decisions included in
their study to test for averting behavior were: increased bottled water purchases among
households buying it prior to the contamination, bottled water purchases by new buyers,
installing home water treatment systems, hauling water from alternate sources and boiling
water. The survey was conducted by mail and respondents were asked to report only those
actions taken as a specific response to groundwater contamination. Their findings, obtained
trough a logit specification, indicate that household’s knowledge of contamination, percep-
tion of risk and presence of children determine whether they undertake averting actions
and that their expenditure levels are higher if young children are present. Bresnahun et al.
(1997) use panel data consisting of repeated observations on 226 Los Angeles area residents
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during 1985-86 to explain defensive responses to air pollution using determinants predicted
by an averting behavior model. Their empirical results indicate that people who experience
smog-related symptoms spend significantly less time outdoors as ozone concentrations ex-
ceed the national standard. Many people also report making other behavioral changes to
avoid smoggy conditions and the propensity to do so appears to increase if health symptoms
are experienced. Other applications have investigated individuals’ eﬀort to reduce symp-
toms of air pollution exposure (Abrahams et al. 2000; Eiswerth et al. 2005). However most
of these studies find it diﬃcult to assign a cost to averting behaviors. There is no monetary
price for many of these actions and no compelling reason to use wage rate for increasing
time spent indoors since it may not be entirely lost.
Another method frequently used by the environmental economist for valuing re-
duced morbidity is the contingent valuation method (CV). CV, first proposed by Ciriacy-
Wantrup (1947) and first applied by Davis (1963), is a survey or questionnaire-based ap-
proach. This method can be thought of as an attempt to directly measure willingness to pay
(−dM/dE in the Berger et al. model presented above). In contingent valuation methods,
randomly selected samples from the general population are given information about a par-
ticular problem. They are then presented with a hypothetical occurrence such as a disaster
and a policy action that ensures against a disaster; they are then asked how much they
would be willing to pay – for instance, in extra utility fees, income taxes, or access fees
– either to avoid a negative occurrence or bring about a positive one. The actual format
may take the form of a direct question (”how much?”) or it may be a bidding procedure
(a ranking of alternatives) or a referendum (yes/no) vote. Contingent valuation studies are
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conducted as face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews, or mail surveys. The face-to-face
is the most expensive survey administration format but is generally considered to be the
best, especially if visual material needs to be presented. Non-response bias is always a con-
cern in all sampling designs. In other words, people who do not respond have, on average,
diﬀerent values than people who do respond.
In principle, contingent valuation methods can be used to estimate the economic
value of anything, even if there is no observable behavior available to deduce values through
other means. Even though the technique requires competent survey analysts to achieve
defensible estimates, the nature of CV studies and the results of CV studies are not diﬃcult
to analyze and describe. However, contingent valuation methods can be very expensive be-
cause of the extensive pre-testing and survey work. Moreover, contingent valuation methods
suﬀer from a particular lack of accuracy: the presence of many biases (these include the
way in which questions are phrased, the socioeconomic profile of respondents, the amount
and type of information they are given etc.).
More fundamentally, contingent valuation approach is based on the assumption
that individuals have well-defined preferences over all alternative states of the world. This
assumption, however, in unreasonable for children, especially for infants. One approach to
valuing the health eﬀects on children is to make the assumption of ”parental sovereignty”
and to value these impacts according to the parents’ willingness to pay for them (see Neidell,
2004). Freeman III (2000) however observes that
[... there is no clear reason for believing that parents’ willingness to pay for
changes that aﬀect their children will be equal to the willingness to pay that the
children would have for changes that aﬀect their own well being. Some authors
have noted that parents do not always seem to be the best judges of what is
good for their children and sometimes engage in activities such as smoking and
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drinking that actually harm their children...].
Even thought contingent evaluation presents these limitations, has great flexibility,
allowing valuation of a wider variety of non-market goods among which individuals well-
being.
Many environmental economist use this method to evaluate health benefits from
reducing pollution. For instance, Alberini et al. (1994) conduct a contingent valuation
survey in three cities of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to estimate willingness to pay to
avoid a recurrence of the episode of illness most recently experienced by the respondent.
Alberini and Krupnik (2000) conduct a contingent valuation survey to estimate WTP to
avoid minor respiratory illnesses. Then they compare cost-of-illness (COI) and willingness-
to-pay (WTP) estimates of the damages from minor respiratory symptoms associated with
air pollution using data from a study in Taiwan in 1991-92.
Several studies have relied on a new approach in estimating the willingness to pay
for improved environmental quality by relying on the health production approach first intro-
duced by Grossman (1972) (see Kiiskinen, 2003). Grossman interprets a person’s health as
a capital stock that exogenously deteriorates at an increasing rate with age. To counteract
this health deterioration, he assumes that individuals invest a portion of their assets into
health production each period. By analyzing the decisions consumers make concerning the
resources allocated to health production such as medical care, time and a healthy life-style
this method try to infer the value of health to the consumers and derive estimate econo-
metrically a measure of individual willingness to pay for a reduction in pollution (Cropper,
1981; Gerking and Stanley, 1986; Dixie and Gerking, 1991; Cropper and Freeman III, 1991).
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Cropper (1981), for instance, extends Grossman’s model of health production and health
demand to incorporate pollution and estimates willingness to pay for health risks related to
an index of air pollutants. Gerking and Stanley (1986) estimate willingness to pay for health
risks related to ozone exposure. They compute the value of a change in health by multi-
plying the cost of preventive activity by an estimated ratio of marginal products of inputs
in the health production function. Harrington and Portney (1987) extended the household
production function model introduced by Grossman to examine explicitly the relationships
among willingness to pay for a reduction in pollution. Dickie and Gerking (1991) used a
set of health symptoms in estimation of functions hypothesized to be associated with air
pollution. Cropper and Freeman III (1991) develop a model of health production in which
the health outcome of interest is the number of hours during a time period that a person
spends in sickness. They show that willingness to pay can be expressed as the product of
the slope of a dose-response relationship times the marginal value of sickness time.
The health production function approach suﬀers from an import limitation too.
The estimation of a health production function is frequently based on instrumental vari-
ables since individual’s life-style and averting expenditure/behavior inputs (that in the
above model is represented by X) may be endogenous. Construction of instruments, how-
ever, usually can be done in a number of ways as theory often says little about how this
problem should be handled and variables used for this purpose are chose depending on what
information is available together with judgement of the investigator. Diﬀerent choices of in-
strumental variables typically can produce diﬀerent estimates of willingness to pay creating
uncertainty.
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1.2.2 The Economic Value of Mortality
Because some forms of pollution may increase mortality or shorten life expectancy,
economists have to identify approaches for valuing life and the benefits of lifesaving activ-
ities. Since death is a more easily measured outcome than illness or injury (death is a
one-dimensional event, whereas there are varying degrees of illness and injury) these meth-
ods are easier to apply.
In estimating the value of lifesaving, economists have followed two schools of
thought. The first approach is based on measurements of the economic productivity of
the individual whose life is at risk. This is referred as human capital approach. The sec-
ond approach is based on the individuals’ WTP to reduce the risk of death (Cropper and
Freeman, 1991; Shepard and Zeckhauser, 1982; Berger et al. 1994; Johansson,1995).
In the standard human capital approach the value of preserving a life Vi (with
reference to the equation 1.13) is equal to the discounted present value of lifetime earnings
lost due to premature mortality. Formally the present value of lifetime earnings is given by:
Vi =
TX
t=j
qj,t (1 + r)
j−t yt (1.20)
where qj,t is the probability of the individual surviving from age j to age t, yt is the
individual earnings at age t, r is discount rate and T is age at retirement from labor force.
This approach has been criticized on a number of grounds: it considers individuals as units
of human capital that produce goods and services for society. The values calculated are
dependent on the age of death and on income, skill level, sex, race and country of residence.
It omits the role of nonmarket production and because of earning diﬀerences by sex and race,
it places a lower value on saving the lives of women and non whites than on saving the lives
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of adult white males. Moreover, the human capital approach assigns zero value to people
who are retired, handicapped or totally disabled and to children (Landefeld and Seskin,
1982). Another important objection is that the human capital approach is inconsistent
with the fundamental premise of welfare economics by which individuals’ preferences should
constitute the cornerstone of the benefit-cost analysis(Cropper and Oates, 1992).
Individuals make decisions everyday that reflect their preferences and how they
value health and mortality risks, such as driving an automobile, smoking cigarettes or living
in polluted areas. Many of these choices involve market decisions. Using evidence on these
market choices, which involve implicit trade-oﬀs between risks and money, economists have
developed estimates of the individuals’ WTP to reduce risk of death. The willingness-to-pay
approach is based on the assumption that changes in individuals’ economic welfare can be
valued according to what individuals are willing (and able) to pay to achieve that change.
According to this assumption, individuals treat longevity like other consumption good and
reveal their preferences through the choices that involve changes in the risk of death and
other economic goods whose values can be measured in monetary terms.
One of the most used approach to measuring willingness to pay to reduce the risk
of death is to infer the value from compensating wage diﬀerentials in the labor market (see
Viscusi and Aldy, 2003 for a complete treatment). The theory behind this approach is
simple:
[...The basic idea behind compensating wage diﬀerentials is that jobs can be
characterized by various attributes, including risk of accidental death. Workers
are described by the amount they require as compensation for diﬀerent risk levels,
while firms are characterized by the amounts they are willing to oﬀer workers
to accept diﬀerent risk levels. The matching of wage oﬀers and acceptances
determines the hedonic wage equation, which describes the compensation received
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for bearing risk in market equilibrium...] (Simon et al., 1999)
Simon et al. (1999) express the individual’s willingness to substitute risk for income
in the labor market as the compensation C that he would require to work at various risk
levels, holding utility constant. Formally:
(1− ρ) (1− φ)U (C + I) = k (1.21)
where φ is the risk of death on the job, and ρ is the risk of dying from all other causes
while I denotes the non-labor income. The worker’s choice of risk level, φ, occurs where
a marginal change in required compensation, C0(φ), equals a marginal change in the wage
oﬀered in market equilibrium, w0(φ), or, equivalently, where the compensation function is
tangent to the hedonic wage equation, w(φ). Equilibrium in the labor market is given by
the locus of tangency points between various required compensation and oﬀer curves. This
locus is the hedonic wage function, and its derivative with respect to risk of death measures
the value of a small change in risk to the worker:
dw
dφ
=
(1− ρ)U (w + I)
(1− ρ) (1− φ)U 0 (w + I) = Vi (1.22)
Equation 1.22 gives the rate at which a worker is willing to substitute income for risk
dw
dφ
that
is equal to his expected utility if he survives risk of death on the job, (1−ρ)U 0(w+I), divided
by his expected marginal utility of income, (1− ρ) (1− φ)U 0 (w + I). Hence, equation 1.22
is a measure of the risk premium that a worker receives to compensate him for risk of
death on job ( we label this relationship, Vi with reference to the equation 1.13). Then,
the compensating wage approach by providing a value Vi that is a measure of individuals
WTP to avoid death risks could be used in the equation 1.13 to measure total change
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of the social value (dT ) of the health eﬀects due to the change in environmental quality.
Cropper and Freeman (1991) and Cropper and Oates (1992) stress that the compensating
wage approach presents at least three problems: the first problem concerns the fact that
compensating wage diﬀerentials exist only if workers are informed of job risks. A second
problem related to this approach is that compensating diﬀerentials seem to exist only in
unionized industries than it may provide estimates of the value of a risk reduction only for
certain segments of the population. Finally, if workers have biased estimates of job risks
market wage premium will yield biased estimates of the value of a risk reduction.
Moreover, compensating wage diﬀerentials approach presents other important lim-
itations. Firstly, it tends to focus on the value adults in the prime of their life place on
reducing their risk of dying, even though according to the epidemiological literature, the
significant correlation between air pollutants and deaths occur among people over 65 (Os-
tro, 1994; Schwartz and Dockery, 1992). In addition, this method tends to focus only on
immediate risk changes. However, when an environmental policy program reduces exposure
to a carcinogen, while the costs of doing so are often incurred in the present, mortality risks
are reduced in the future, following a latency period.
Diﬃculties in measuring the individual’s WTP using labor market compensating
wage approach and its limitations have led to the use of CV to measuring willingness to
pay. As we have already seen in the evaluation of morbidity cases (section 1.2.1), CV
presents great flexibility but also a number of limitations ( for a complete treatment of
these problems see Diamond and Hasuman, 1994).
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1.3 Summary and Conclusions
There is a substantial amount of literature on theoretical and empirical aspects of
the economic valuation of policies and instruments to improve environmental quality and
human health. Here, starting with Weitzman’s (1974) seminal work, we have provided a
short but comprehensive overview of key literature on the choices faced by policy makers
concerning price-based versus quantity-based instruments to regulate pollution and protect
human health. We have reviewed the methods employed in estimating pollution abatement
costs and pollution related health damages whose comparison (with reference to Weitzman’s
theoretical rule) should form the basis for the choices among the price-based and quantity-
based regulation instruments.
The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the diﬃculties that analysts face in
estimating the value of pollution health damages or benefits from reduced pollution. In fact,
while measuring control costs seems relatively straightforward, measuring and valuing the
health impacts of pollution is a very complex task: we have shown that the available methods
of economic analysis are often rudimentary and the answers vary greatly depending on the
method used. In recent years, however, considerable progress has been made, especially
with respect to air and water pollution.
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Chapter 2
An Economic Evaluation of
Life-Style and Air
Pollution-Related
Damages: Results from the BRFSS
2.1 Introduction
Air pollution is a major environmental problem aﬀecting the developing and the
developed countries alike. Various studies by economists and epidemiologists have tried to
understand the relationship between health and air pollution and other relevant factors:
the eﬀects of air pollution on health are very complex as there are many diﬀerent pollutants
and their individual eﬀects vary from one to the other. Despite this, the World Health
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Organization (WHO) estimates that every year 800,000 people die prematurely from lung
cancer, cardiovascular and respiratory diseases caused by outdoor pollution. Other adverse
health eﬀects include increased incidence of chronic bronchitis and acute respiratory illness,
exacerbation of asthma and impairment of lung function.
In analyzing the relationship between air pollution and health, it is important to
consider the influence of the individual’s specific behavior too, since individual life-style is
another crucial determinant of the risk of illness. Concerning the individual health and
health behaviors, the economic literature has often relied on the assumption that individu-
als treat health as exogenous and has not recognized that they may undertake actions that
increase or reduce health risks. Only in the last thirty years the health economics litera-
ture, following Grossman’s (1972) seminal paper, has recognized health as an outcome of
a production process which involves medical care and depends on several factors including
individual behaviors.
Grossman (1972) interprets a person’s health as a capital stock that exogenously
deteriorates at an increasing rate with age. To counteract this health deterioration, he
assumes that individuals invest a portion of their assets into health production each period.
Hence, the level of health of an individual may be not totally exogenous but it can depend,
at least in part, on the resources allocated to its production like medical care, time and a
healthy life-style.
The demand-for-health model by Grossman has become a cornerstone in the field
of health economics. The model, however, is not undisputed. A key criticism has been that
it fails to take into account the uncertainty of the future health status and the uncertainty
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of investments in health production. By investing in health, individuals do not determine
with certainty their health status — environment and chance are two factors which may in-
terfere — but rather they influence it quite substantially. Grossman’s model, however, does
not account for uncertainty as it includes neither explicit acknowledgment of uncertainty
nor the description of illness, even though the fundamental relationship between health and
uncertainty has been established by economic theory (Arrow, 1963). Subsequent contribu-
tions analyze individual health behavior when health status is uncertain and governed by a
stochastic process (Cropper 1977, Dardanoni and Wagstaﬀ ,1991, Selden, 1993, Zweifel and
Breyer,1997).
In fact, the probability of having good health is influenced by choosing one’s life-
style, thus making better and worse health status more or less probable, and by using
medical advice, pharmaceuticals, hospital treatment, etc. in order to restore good health.
Although one’s current health status certainly provides some information about the like-
lihood of future health outcomes, the risk of getting a disease may also depend on other
factors such as pollution exposure, smoking history, which are more or less independent of
one’s observable health state1.
In the next sections we focus on how individual health habits, outdoor air quality
and the presence of a pathological condition combine to aﬀect the likelihood of a good or bad
health status, in a second-best world characterized by uncertainty on the level of health and
1For instance Carbone et al. (2005) stressed that
[...a frustrating feature of many types of cancer is that they do not produce symptoms that
would prompt someone to see a doctor until they are advanced beyond the stage at which they
can be easily treated...].
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in which an individual is not able to avoid adverse health shocks completely. The framework
is built on the basic concepts and ideas of the demand for health by Grossman (1972) and
on Cropper’s (1981) model that extends Grossman’s model to incorporate pollution.
We construct a model of health accumulation in which, following Grossman (1972)
and subsequent contribution by Cropper (1981), we assume that health depreciates at an
increasing rate with age and air pollution. The main diﬀerences here are that the level
of health is uncertain and for individuals, who suﬀer or have suﬀered from a pathological
condition, illness enters directly the rate of health depreciation too. As in Cropper’s (1981)
model, we assume that when pollution increases it becomes more costly to reduce the
probability of facing health shocks. Individuals feel less healthy because they perceive
health depreciation rate to be higher. Hence, they may choose to invest less in their health
and maintain lower health stock because of the higher net investment costs. In this sense, a
higher pollution concentration may have two eﬀects on health: a direct eﬀect which consists
in an increase of natural rate of depreciation and an indirect eﬀect, described by Cropper
(1981), by which individuals will invest less in health and display a higher probability of
suﬀering from health shocks. We will analyze this aspect in the section 4 focusing on
the relationship between increasing pollution and health investment decisions. In addition
we will examine if chronic illnesses, by altering the rate to which health capital stock
deteriorates, have any influence on the individuals’ health investment decisions too.
To estimate the health accumulation model and investigate the relation between
health status, pollution, and health investment decisions, we use three diﬀerent measures of
overall health: a dichotomous measure of blood pressure; a dichotomous measure of func-
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tional limitations and disability; a self-assessed health measure that is common in empirical
research (Contoyannis and Jones, 2004, Balia and Jones, 2004 etc.). Since we have included
life-style variables as regressors in the health equation, a problem of potential simultaneity
may arise. Hence we try to correct the potential endogeneity of the behavioral variables
by using a recursive multivariate probit model (Contoyannis and Jones, 2004, Blaylock and
Blisard, 1992).
The model is estimated using data based on the 2001 Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS), which however does not measure environmental quality;
environmental information at the metropolitan area-level is available from the 2001 EPA’s
Air Quality System (AQS) database and can be used in conjunction with BRFSS data.
Data are merged by the metropolitan area-level which is available both in BRFSS and EPA
data.
In particular, we concentrate our attention on one of the main sources of air
pollution worldwide, i.e.motor vehicle emissions. The most important standard related to
motor vehicles pollution concerns carbon monoxide. CO air concentrations are generally
high in areas with heavy traﬃc congestion. Therefore we can consider carbon monoxide as
a proxy for vehicle emissions (U.S., EPA 2000)
According to our results a higher concentration of carbon monoxide has respec-
tively a negative impact on the probability of enjoying good health and a positive influence
on healthy habits. Then, concerning vehicular air pollution our results do not support Crop-
per’s (1981) model: people living in polluted areas tend to invest more in health, probably
in order to counteract to the deterioration of a higher depreciation rate due to an increasing
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pollution. Arguably, people lead a healthy life-style to increase their health stock and build
up resistance against pollution symptoms and future damages.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2 introduces a model of health produc-
tion. Section 3 describes the data and the variables for the analysis. Section 4 presents the
estimation strategies and the econometric results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion.
The definition of the variables, descriptive statistics and tables with estimation coeﬃcients
are in Appendix .
2.2 A Model of Health Production
Assume that each individual is endowed with a stock of health capital Ht that
evolves according to:
4Ht+1 = Ht+1 −Ht = f (P,Λ, E, t)− ϑt−1∆Dt − δtHt − ϑt (2.1)
where δt ∈ (0, 1) is the natural rate at which health deteriorates. ϑt is a random shock. We
assume that the shock could be any injury which causes a reduction in the current state
of health. Moreover, we assume that ϑt can take a value of zero when the shock does not
occur and a positive value ϑt > 0 when it does occur. The transition probability of having
a shock next period is assumed to be inversely related to the stock of health. Then, the
size of health is important since it aﬀects the probability for an individual of enjoying good
or bad health. Individuals can aﬀect the probability of bad or good health next period by
“investing” or “disinvesting” in health.
For an individual who has not suﬀered from a health shock in the past (ϑt−1 = 0)
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the investments/disinvestments in health are captured by a household production function
f (P,Λ, E, t), where P is preventive medical cares such as regular exams, screening tests
designed to catch a disease before it has the chance to spread or immunization such as flu
shot vaccine. E is the exogenous education level that is assumed to aﬀect the productivity
of producing health2. Λ indicates the individuals behavior. We distinguish between healthy
and unhealthy behavior. A proxy for healthy behavior consists, for instance, in a healthy
diet (fruits and vegetables consumption etc.) or in sport activities practice, while a proxy
for unhealthy behavior includes consumption of hazardous goods like alcohol consumption
or cigarettes smoking. f (P,Λ, E, t) is increasing in preventive medical care, in education
and it can increase or fall in individual behavior Λ. In particular f (P,Λ, E, t) is increasing
in a healthy behavior and decreases if individuals disinvest in their health by consuming,
for instance, hazardous goods. It follows that while a healthy lifestyle increases the stock of
health capital, actions detrimental to health such as cigarette smoking and excessive alcohol
consumption lower the stock of health capital.
If a health shock has occurred in the past (ϑt−1 > 0) the stock of illness Dt will
2Based on the theory of the demand for health (Grossman, 1972), we expect that schooling plays an
important role in influencing the productivity of health inputs: individuals who choose higher levels of
schooling are observed to be healthier than those choosing lower level of schooling. One explanation of this
empirical regularity is that education increases the productivity of producing health i.e. more health can be
produced for the same inputs (Gerdtham et al., 1999, Berger and Leigh, 1989). Schooling helps people choose
healthier life-styles by improving their knowledge of the relationship between health behaviors and health
outcomes (Kenkel, 1991). A more educated person may have more knowledge about the harmful eﬀects
of cigarette smoking, pollution exposition, alcohol consumption or about what constitutes an appropriate,
healthy diet. Furthermore, schooling increases information about the importance of having regular exams
or screening tests to prevent an illness or at least to minimize disease.
Grossman and Kaestner (1997) present an overview of studies on the relation between education and
health. This survey shows that higher educated people are less likely to smoke, exercise more and are more
likely to participate in screening programs for breast cancer and cervix cancer. They discuss three broad
explanations of the relationship between education and health. The first is that education improves health,
the second that education and health are related through their relationship to a third variable, and the third
explanation for why education and health are related is that health causes education: we do not consider
the issues of reverse causation in this paper. We will assume that a higher education aﬀects the individual
health status by leading people to choose healthier behaviors.
48
aﬀect directly the health accumulation. The stock of illness is characterized by the following
law of motion:
∆Dt = Dt −Dt−1 = g (R,E,Λ, t)− αDt−1 (2.2)
where α ∈ (0, 1) is the natural rate of depreciation of illness stock caused by the antibody
activities.
If an adverse shock aﬀects the stock of health, individuals can operate to reduce
illness: illness is decreasing in recuperative medical care R, in education and in healthy
behavior, while it increases because of adverse behavior. This concept is captured by a
household production function g (R,E,Λ, t).
We assume that an increase in the stock of disease ∆Dt > 0 will gradually reduce
health by increasing the probability of health shock in next period while a decrease in the
stock of illness will decrease the probability of encountering a shock in the future. Reduced
illness, from a steady state level, trough curative medical care and reduction in hazardous
goods consumption can be considered an investment in health.
As we can note the marginal products of curative medical care and of a healthier
behavior increase with the size of the shock, which can be considered a measure of the
severity of illness. In terms of health it means that the larger is the shock the more severe
is the illness and the more dangerous is, for instance, to consume goods like alcohol or
tobacco.
In order to introduce the impacts of the environment, our analysis takes changes
in environmental conditions to influence the rate at which an individual’s stock of health
depreciates. Following Grossman (1972) and subsequent contribution by Cropper (1981) we
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assume that health depreciates over time and with the ambient air pollution. However, we
partly modify Cropper’s (1981) assumption allowing the stock of illness to enter the rate of
depreciation. In particular we assume that:
δt = hδ0
¡
1 + δ¯
¢t
Ψφt + (1− h) δ0
¡
1 + δ¯
¢t
ΨφtD
γ
t (2.3)
where h is and indicator function which takes value 1 if ϑt−1 = 0 and value zero if ϑt−1 > 0.
Ψ is the air pollution concentration to which an individual is exposed. Pollution enters
directly the rate of decay and physically alters the state of a person’s health.
Illness increases the health depreciation rate; to counteract this deterioration, in-
dividuals can invest a portion of their assets into healthy behavior or in curative medical
care in order to reduce the stock of illness and restore the initial rate of depreciation.
As in Cropper’s (1981) model, when pollution increases it becomes more costly
to reduce the probability of a shock. Individuals feel less healthy because they perceive
δ to be higher. Hence, they may choose to invest less in their health and maintain lower
health stock because of the higher net investment costs. In this sense, a higher pollution
concentration may have two eﬀects on health: a direct eﬀect which consists in an increase
of δ and an indirect eﬀect, described by Cropper (1981), by which individuals will invest
less in health and display a higher probability of suﬀering from health shocks. Cropper,
however, has not deeply studied this aspect in her paper. We will analyze in the section
4 the relationship between pollution and life-style variables and we will examine if chronic
illnesses, by altering the rate at which health capital stock deteriorates, have any influence
on the individuals’ health investment decisions.
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2.3 Data and Variables
To analyze how individual life-style, pollution and health shocks combine to aﬀect
the likelihood of a good health status and the amount of investment in health we will use data
based on the 2001 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Survey3. The BRFSS is the
world’s largest cross-sectional telephone survey conducted every year since 1984 by health
state departments in collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Fifteen states participated in the first survey in 1984. The number of participating states
grew to thirty-three in 1987, to forty-five in 1990 and to all fifty-one States (including the
District of Columbia) in 1996.
Data on preventive health practices and risk behaviors were collected from a ran-
dom sample of adults (18 years of age or older) living in households through monthly
telephone survey4. The BRFSS contains rather detailed information about health status,
diseases, life-style, education and other individual characteristics. It is designed to monitor
the prevalence of the major behavioral risks among adults ( tobacco use, alcohol consump-
tion etc.) associated with chronic diseases, and premature mortality.
Pollutants in the environment have been linked to chronic diseases such as cancer,
asthma, and cardiovascular health problems too. Although the BRFSS does not directly
measure environmental quality environmental information at the metropolitan area-level
is available from the 2001 EPA’s Air Quality System (AQS) database and can be used in
3Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System Survey
Data. Atlanta, Georgia: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (2001).
4We have to take into account that the BRFSS is a survey of private households and it may be prone to
selection bias in terms of assessing health and its interaction with behavioral indicators, as those individual
with severe or chronic health problems and disabilities are “more likely to be in a hospital, or otherwise
unavailable for interview”. (Cox et. al., 1987, Cropper, 1981).
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conjunction with BRFSS. Thus, we have merged the two datasets by metropolitan area5.
The EPA’s Air Quality System (AQS) database contains measurements of criteria
pollutants such as ozone (O3), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), and particulate
matter (PM2.5, PM10) concentrations at sites in all 50 states, plus the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Ambient measurements are collected from a network
of national, state and local air monitoring stations, and used to create the Air Quality Index
(AQI)6.
After correcting for missing values, the sample contains 4,913 individuals.
2.3.1 Health and Life-Style Variables
The model is estimated using three diﬀerent measures of overall health: a mea-
sure of blood pressure, a measure of disability and a self-assessed health measure. Berger
and Leigh (1989), in analyzing the relationship between school and good health, introduce
blood pressure as a dependent variable representing overall health. Many pollutants pro-
duce harmful eﬀects on the blood and the coronary system and may be one of the cause
of cardiovascular diseases. Since blood pressure is the most important predictor of car-
diovascular disease, which is the greatest killer in the U.S., we expect that high blood
pressure is related to air pollution. Following Berger and Leigh we create a binary variable
(BLOODPRESSURE) that takes value one if respondents report that they suﬀer from high
5Because the environmental data from the AQS were collected during 2001 and reported at the metropoli-
tan area-level, they should only be used in conjunction with 2001 BRFSS data that have been re-weighted
for metropolitan area-level analysis.
6The AQI is used to report daily air quality based on levels of the criteria pollutants. The AQI scale runs
from 0 to 500. It is categorized into the following six groups: 0-50 = Good; 51-100 = Moderate; 101-150 =
Unhealthy for Sensitive Groups; 151-200 = Unhealthy; 201-300 = Very Unhealthy; 301-500 = Hazardous.
Additional information on the AQI is available at http://airnow.gov/.
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blood pressure and zero otherwise. We include, as a measure of health, a binary variable
(AC LIMIT) that takes value one if respondents are limited in any activities because of
health problems and zero otherwise. This variable is traditionally used by the economists
to represent the presence of work-preventing or work- limiting disabilities due to health
problems. Moreover, following Contoyannis and Jones (2004) we also use, as an indicator
for health, the self- assessed health (SAH), which is a five category variable rating from
poor to excellent. We construct a binary indicator with the value one if individual report
that their health is excellent, very good or good, and zero otherwise (fair or poor).
Following U.Schneider and S. Schneider (2006) we distinguish between health out-
come and self-assessed health. Health outcomes such as high blood pressure and disabilities
are objective measures of health7, which are themselves influenced by the health behavior
and that are also proxies for pathological conditions. Self-assessed health measures the
individual’s perception of her health capital stock. It is a function of health outcome and
health behavior.
The endogenous behavioral variables employed are those which cover as much
as possible the life-style categories used by Belloc and Breslow’s (1972) epidemiological
studies of around 7000 individuals conducted in Alameda County, California: the so called
“Alameda Seven”. These seven categories are: diet, smoking, alcohol, physical exercise,
sleep, weight (for height) and stress to which we add preventive medical care. Weight (for
height) is included using an indicator related to the body mass index (BMI). BMI can be
7In the BRFSS survey the objective measures of health are self-reported too. Then they may be subject
to measurement errors.
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considered as a measure of obesity8 and is defined as weight in kilograms divided by height
in meters squared (Kg/m2). According to the World Health Organization (WHO) persons
with BMI ≥ 30Kg/m2 are classified as obese. We do not include sleep among the life-style
variables because of the lack of a reasonable proxy in the BRFSS data set.
As a measure of diet, we use a binary variable (DIET) that takes value one if
respondent consumes fruits and vegetables at least once per day and zero otherwise.
To measure smoking behavior we also employ a binary variable (SMOKE) that
takes value one if respondent is everyday smoker or someday smoker and zero if she is a
former smoker or non- smoker. Again we employ a binary variable (ALCOHOL) which
is equal to one if an individual is at risk for heavy drinking and zero if she is not. This
categorization is gender specific: drinking is defined heavy if it is greater than two drinks
per day for men and one per day for women.
To measure the exercise habit we employ again a binary variable (EXERCISE)
which equals one if an individual participates in any level of leisure time exercise or physical
activity in the thirty days before the interview (other than as part of a regular job) and
zero otherwise.
The variable that we use to measure (the presence of) obesity is based on BMI.
This variable (OBESE) takes the value one if respondent is at risk for overweight, or obese
(BMI equal or greater than 25.0000) and it takes value zero if respondents are not at risk
(BMI less than 25.0000).
Stress was also recognized as behavioral variable which aﬀects health in the Alameda
8Obesity is considered a risk factor for several diseases. It is often associated with aspects of an individual’s
life-style such as insuﬃcient exercise and inappropriate diet or nutrition. Those who are obese are expected
to have poorer health.
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study. STRESS takes value one if during the thirty days before the interview respondent’s
mental health (which includes stress and depression) was not good, 0 otherwise.
To measure preventive medical care utilization we include again a dummy variable
(FLUSHOT) which takes value one if an individual had a flu shot in the year before the
interview and takes value zero otherwise. We do not include a proxy of recuperative medical
care because of the lack of good proxy in the data set.
TABLE 2 shows a simple descriptive analysis, which presents sample means and
standard deviations for the variables used in the models. It is worth noting that the sample
(that comprises 42 per cent men and 58 per cent women) is made up of individuals whose
behaviors are mostly healthy: only 27 per cent of individuals are current smokers, only 4.5
per cent of individuals consume drinks heavily and only 28 per cent of them suﬀer from
stress; while 97 per cent of them follow a healthy diet and 77 per cent devote time to
physical activity.
2.3.2 Other Characteristics
The exogenous variables in the model can be grouped into categories which are
listed, together with the life-style variables, in TABLE 1. As can be seen from the table,
we consider the following categories: health coverage (including HMO9 plans), prior health
in order to capture health status at the beginning of the observation period, education,
marital status10, employment status, race, physical characteristics, household composition,
9A health maintenance organization (HMO) is a type of managed care plan that provides health coverage
in the United States to its members through a network of doctors, hospitals, and health care providers.
HMOs are popular alternatives to traditional health care plans oﬀered by insurance companies because they
can cover a wide variety of services, usually at a significantly lower cost.
10In the past decade many empirical findings have documented a potential health benefit of marriage:
married people (including those who cohabit) appear to be healthier and to have a longer life expectancy
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air pollution.
Arguably the principal source of air pollutants worldwide is motor vehicle emis-
sions, although many other sources have been found to contribute to the ever growing
problem. The most important standard relating to motor vehicles pollution is for carbon
monoxide. CO air concentrations are generally high in areas with heavy traﬃc congestion
then we can consider carbon monoxide as a proxy for vehicle emissions (U.S., EPA 2000).
Carbon monoxide is a colorless, odorless and tasteless gas that is a product of the incomplete
combustion of carbonaceous material used as fuels for transportation. The major health
concerns associated with exposure to CO are its strong tie with the hemoglobin molecule,
forming carboxyhemoglobin (COHb). COHb impairs the oxygen-carrying capacity of the
blood, this can impact on the brain, nervous tissue, heart muscle and other tissues that
require large amounts of oxygen to function. The most susceptible to the health eﬀects
of ambient air exposure to CO include those with ischemic heart disease and other form
of cardiovascular disease (Ostro, 1994). Since carbon monoxide remains one of the major
air pollutant of concern, we will use, as proxy of air pollution, the daily maximum level of
carbon monoxide air quality index (AQI).
than the non-married. Some of the most convincing evidence is consistent with the marriage protection
hypothesis, which assumes that “. . .married individuals engage in low-risk activities, share resources and
enjoy caring from each other. . . ” (Hu, Wolfe, 2002)
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2.4 Estimation Strategies and Results
2.4.1 Multivariate Estimation
The theoretical model describes the relationship between health status, life style
and pollution variables. An important question is whether life-style follows from health
status or if health status follows from life-style. In the theoretical model we have assumed
that not only individuals’ behaviors may impact on health status but that health status in
turn, by influencing the health rate of depreciation, may impact on the health investment
decisions. Then, from a methodological point of view, it should be noted that the perceived
health and the health outcome equations are structural equations since the health behavior
inputs may be endogenous. Eﬃcient and consistent estimation of the parameters in the
health equations requires a model that takes account of the nature of the variables used. The
potential simultaneity, which can arise with the inclusion of life-style variables as regressors,
can be corrected by using a recursive multivariate probit model11 (Contoyannis and Jones,
2004, Blaylock and Blisard, 1992). Following Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) the multivariate
probit model can be described by the following equations system:
y∗1i = β
0
1x1i + ε1i
·
·
·
y∗Mi = β
0
MxMi + εMi
(2.4)
11The multivariate probit model with endogenous dummies belongs to the general class of simultaneous
equation models (see Maddala, 1983).
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Here we have m = 1, ...,M equations and i = 1, ..., N observations. We have M latent
variables y∗m (with m = 1, ...,M) and M observed dummy indicators ym. For the latent
variable we assume that
ym =



1
0
if y∗m > 0
otherwise
(2.5)
The latent variables are assumed to be linear function of the vector of exogenuous variables
xmi where βm is the associated parameters vector. ε1i, ..., εMi are the error terms distributed
as multivariate normal, each with a mean zero and a variance covariance matrix Σ. Σ has
values of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations ρjk = ρkj on oﬀ-diagonal elements
(where ρjk is the covariance between the error terms of equation j and k).
In the above setting, the exogeneity condition is stated in terms of the corre-
lation coeﬃcient, which can be interpreted as the correlation between the unobservable
explanatory variables of the diﬀerent equations. All the equations in (2.4) can be estimated
separately as single probit models only in the case of independent error terms εmi i.e. the
coeﬃcient ρjk is not significantly diﬀerent of zero (Maddala, 1983).
Following U.Schneider and B.Schneider (2006), we identify three classes of depen-
dent variables: the individual health behaviors, the health outcomes and the self-assessed
health.
The seven equations for the health behavior variables are modeled as reduced-form
equations. The health outcome equations are structural equations with the health behavior
variables as explanatory factors. Last, in the self-assessed health equation health behavior
and health outcomes are included as regressors. Therefore, we construct and estimate two
58
systems of nine equations (m = 9) with seven reduced-form and two structural equations.
One of the two structural equations is always represented by the SAH equation and the
other one by one of the two diﬀerent health outcomes: blood pressure and disability. Thus:
y∗1i = β
0
1x1i + ε1i
y∗2i = β
0
2x2i + ε2i
y∗3i = β
0
3x3i + ε3i
y∗4i = β
0
4x4i + ε4i
y∗5i = β
0
5x5i + ε5i
y∗6i = β
0
6x6i + ε6i
y∗7i = β
0
7x7i + ε7i
y∗8i = β
0
8x8i + ε8i = δ81y1i + δ82y2i + δ83y3i + δ84y4i+
+δ85y5i + δ86y6i + δ87y7i + α08z8i + ε8i
y∗9i = β
0
9x9i + ε9i = δ91y1i + δ92y2i + δ93y3i + δ94y4i+
+δ95y5i + δ96y6i + δ97y7i + δ98y8i + α09z9i + ε9i
(2.6)
where xli (with l = 1, ..., 7) and zhi (with h = 8, 9) are vectors of exogenous variables, βl and
αh are parameter vectors, δho (with o = 1, ..., 8) are scalar parameters and β
0
h = (δho, α
0
h).
Estimation of the above described multivariate probit model requires some con-
siderations for the identification of the model parameters. Maddala (1983) proposes that at
least one of the reduced-form exogenous variables is not included in the structural equations
as explanatory variables. Following Maddala’s approach we impose exclusion restrictions.
For the reduced form, we use marital status12 and employment status variables assuming
12To balance statistical fit of the model we use the Bayesian information criterion proposed by Schwarz
(1978). This criterion suggests the exclusion of the variables that describe marital status from the health
outcomes and the SAH equation. Kenkel (1995), Contoyannis and Jones (2004), Balia and Jones (2004)
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that they have only an indirect eﬀect on health through the life-style variables. In addition,
we exclude from the self-assessed health and the health outcome equations the variables that
indicate the number of adults and children living in the household which are considered to
influence to a certain extent individual’s preferences and decisions about health. Moreover,
for the outcome equations, the variables physical pain and chronic symptoms are excluded
to avoid causality problems with the dependent variables.
The reference individual in the model is female, married and employed. She is aged
eighteen years old or more and she has attended high school or is high school graduated.
The estimation of a multivariate probit is carried out using the Stata software
which applies the method of Simulated Maximum Likelihood estimation. Stata provides
the statistic z = ρˆ/Sρˆ to test the hypothesis H0 : ρ = 0 . If the error terms are independent,
the Maximum Simulated Likelihood estimation is equivalent to the separate Maximum
Likelihood probit estimation.
SAH and Activity Limitations Equations
The first two columns of TABLE 3a show partial eﬀects for the structural SAH and
activity limitations equations estimated in the full recursive model, using the multivariate
probit specification.
Starting from the life-style variables we can observe that in the health outcome
equation (ac limit equation) smoking behavior has the expected significant positive eﬀects
exclude marital status from the health and the death equation claiming that marital status influence only
indirectly the probability of good or bad health and the probability of death, through the life-style habits:
smoke, alcohol, diet etc.
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on activity limitations as well as stress and obesity, while diet variable and alcohol consump-
tion do not contribute to explain the probability of suﬀering from disability. In the SAH
equation,with exception of the variables alcohol and diet, all life-style variables are statis-
tically significant too. Their partial eﬀects on health lead to the conclusion that unhealthy
habits decrease the probability of enjoying good health. Immunization is statistically sig-
nificant only in the SAH equation with a negative partial eﬀect. One of the possible reasons
for the ambiguous sign is that health status and immunization, in this cross section study,
are observed at the same point in time, so the utilization of flu shot vaccine may be the
result, rather than the cause of poor health. In fact, it is more plausible that an individual
with poor health status will receive preventive medical care and immunization by seeing a
physician on a regular basis that will encourage him to have preventive test or vaccinations.
Then, when interviewed, those who had flu shot display a higher probability of suﬀering be-
cause of bad health. Moreover, the model predicts that the probability of bad health status
increases with age and for individuals who faced health problems in the thirty days and in
the year before the interview. On the other hand age aﬀects positively the probability of
having a healthier life-style.
Vehicular air pollution presents a direct negative impact on the probability of en-
joying good health but it has not the expected negative indirect eﬀect on health investment.
In fact it turns out that people react to a higher natural health depreciation rate, due to
increasing pollution concentration, by investing more in their health. For most healthy
people the symptoms of air pollution exposure usually go away as soon as the air quality
improves. However, certain groups of people are more sensitive to the eﬀects of air pol-
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lution than others. People with heart or lung disease also react more severely to polluted
air. During times of heavy pollution, their condition may worsen to the point that they
must limit their activities or even seek additional medical care. Probably, individuals, in
particular the frailer ones, lead a healthy life-style to increase their health stock to reduce
the air pollution symptoms and future damages.
Schooling is positively related to perceived health: a higher degree of education
increases the probability of feeling well but it has no significant impact on the probability
of suﬀering from health impairment. Schooling aﬀects health behavior too. There is a clear
indication of the allocative eﬀects of schooling, since schooling is related to the life-style
variables in a health promoting way: attending a college school, or having a college school
degree aﬀects positively exercise and the probability of following an healthy diet. A higher
degree of education has a negative impact on cigarettes and alcohol consumption and on
the obesity risk.
Marital status has a large impact on the life-style variables. In particular, marriage
seems to influence positively healthy habits while being divorced, separated, never married,
or an unmarried couple has positive impact on smoke and on alcohol consumption and in
general on bad habits.
People in the labor force show a higher probability of enjoying good health and
a higher probability of following better health behavior, while those who are involuntarily
unemployed exhibit adverse health activities: they smoke more and suﬀer stress more often
than people who are in the labor market. Retired individuals, indeed, follow healthier
behaviors.
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Referring to the household composition variables we can observe that the presence
of children less than eighteen years old has is negatively correlated to cigarettes and alcohol
consumption. An increasing number of men in a household is negatively correlated to the
healthy habits: it increases the probability of people choosing to drink heavily and the
probability of being overweight or obese but has a positive impact on exercise.
Last, health insurance increases the probability of good health perception. It has
a significant impact on the individual behavior: it decreases the probability of smoking and
of following an unhealthy diet it reduces the probability of being stressed and it encourages
the use of preventive care.
TABLE 5 shows the estimated statistically significant correlation coeﬃcients be-
tween the disturbance of the nine equations system. The null of exogeneity is rejected in
seventeen cases13. As we can note there exists a statistically significant correlation between
the disturbance of the health impairment equation and the equation for smoke, diet, exer-
cise and stress. Then, unobservable that increase the likelihood of bad health, increase the
probability of doing physical exercise and the probability of following a correct diet with
fruits and vegetable, while it decreases the probability of smoking and of being stressed.
The negative coeﬃcients concerning smoke and stress and the positive correlation
coeﬃcients on exercise and diet show that individuals with poor health tend to adopt
healthier behaviors with respect to individuals with better health who tend to adopt an
unhealthy behavior. Moreover, there exists a positive correlation between SAH equation
disturbance and the disturbance of smoke equation that is consistent with the above results.
13The statistically significant correlation coeﬃcients suggest that the null hypothesis of nine univariate
probit model or the hypothesis of independence across the error terms of the nine latent equations, can be
rejected, and multivariate probit model is a better model for the observed data.
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SAH and Blood Pressure Equations
TABLE 4a-4b present the results for the system in which perceived health is mea-
sured again by SAH and health outcome is measured by another important indicator of
overall health that is blood pressure. Starting with the endogenous variables, regular ex-
ercise has the expected significant positive eﬀect on the probability of feeling well, while it
has a negative but not significant impact on the probability of suﬀering from high blood
pressure. Smoking behavior and alcohol consumption decrease the probability of perceiving
good health. Smoke does not influence the likelihood of suﬀering from high blood pressure,
while alcohol has a positive significant eﬀect on this health condition. This result seems sur-
prising since blood pressure is often related not only to the adverse health eﬀects of alcohol
but also of smoking behavior: the nicotine in cigarettes and other tobacco products causes
blood vessels to constrict and heart to beat faster, which temporarily raises blood pressure.
It is well known that quitting smoking can significantly lower the risk of heart disease and
heart attack, as well as help lower blood pressure. Obesity and stress variables show a
significant negative eﬀect on SAH and increase the likelihood of suﬀering from high blood
pressure. In this model, as the previous one, flu shot variable shows a negative coeﬃcient
on SAH and a positive coeﬃcient on blood pressure but the coeﬃcients are not statistically
significant.
The probability of perceiving bad health increases with pollution. Again pollution
has a positive impact on the health investments: a higher pollution concentration decreases
the probability of smoking, of being obese and of suﬀering because of stress or mental
problems. Moreover, if outdoor pollution increases individuals will spent more time doing
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physical exercise and will consume more preventive medical care. Then, this model confirms
that an increasing level of ambient air pollution will have negative direct eﬀect on the
likelihood of good health but it will have a positive impact on healthy behavior.
The eﬀect of schooling on health is similar across the two health models: those
with more schooling are observed to display a higher probability of perceiving good health
but a higher degree of education has no significant impact on blood pressure. This model
also shows that a higher degree of education helps individuals to choose healthier life-style:
more schooling increases the probability of vigorous physical activities and increases the
probability of following an healthy diet. On the other hand it has a negative influence on
the probability of consuming hazardous goods and of being obese.
Referring to predisposing variables, the probability of enjoying good health de-
creases with age due to higher health depreciation rate and to higher morbidity risks. On
the other hand age has a positive impact on healthy habits. Being white relative to other
race is associated with a greater probability of perceiving good health and a lower proba-
bility of suﬀering from high blood pressure. Being female has not significant eﬀect on SAH
and blood pressure outcome.
Concerning the other estimated coeﬃcients we find similar results to the SAH- ac-
tivity limitations model: being married and being in the labor force leads to more healthy
habits. Young children is negatively correlated the probability of hazardous goods con-
sumption whereas the presence of man is positively correlated to it. Men have a positive
influence on the probability of doing regular exercise but also a positive influence on the
probability of being obese or overweight and a negative impact on having immunization.
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TABLE 6 shows the statistically significant estimated correlation coeﬃcients be-
tween blood pressure, SAH and life-style variable equations. A positive and a negative
significant correlation exists respectively between the SAH equation disturbance and the
disturbance of the equation for smoke and diet: some unobservable that increases the like-
lihood of perceiving good health increases the probability of consuming cigarettes while
unobservable that increases the probability of feeling well decreases the likelihood of a
healthy diet. The negative correlation coeﬃcient concerning diet and the positive corre-
lation coeﬃcient between SAH and smoke disturbances show that people who enjoy good
health tend to behave in an unhealthy way and to invest less in their health than frailer
people. This result is consistent with the findings of the previous model. We can conclude
that individuals with poor health status try to counteract to the greater deterioration of
their health, due to a higher health depreciation rate, by behaving in a healthier way, en-
couraged by the fact that the marginal product of their investment in health will be higher
the more the illness or the pathological condition is severe.
2.5 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter develops and applies a Grossman-style health production model set
up in discrete time to explain how environmental pollution, life-style, and chronic conditions
combine to aﬀect the health capital stock and health investment decisions. The quality of
the environment turns out to aﬀect both health capital and health investments. According
to our results a higher concentration of carbon monoxide has respectively a negative im-
pact on the probability of enjoying good health and a positive influence on healthy habits.
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Then, concerning vehicular air pollution our results do not support Cropper’s (1981) model:
people living in polluted areas tend to invest more in health probably to counteract to the
deterioration of a higher depreciation rate due to an increasing pollution. Arguably, peo-
ple lead a healthy life-style to increase their health stock and build up resistance against
pollution symptoms and future damages.
What may at first seem surprising is that the partial eﬀect of CO on health is
relatively small. However, in estimating the relationship between vehicular pollution and
health, we have not considered that pollution exposure may be endogenously determined:
people with high preferences for clean air may choose to live in areas with better air quality
and far from areas in which vehicular traﬃc is more intense. On the other hand households
can respond to an increasing level of outdoor pollution, for instance, by avoiding exposure
or mitigating the eﬀects of the exposure once they occur (Cropper and Oates, 1992). If
people respond to a higher pollution concentration by increasing the avoidance behavior or
by mitigating the eﬀects, for instance, trough curative care to the point that health actually
improves, not controlling for this aspect may yield estimates that are lower bounds of the
true eﬀect (Neidell, 2004).
Suﬀering from a pathological condition aﬀects both health stock and health in-
vestments. We can conclude that individuals with poor health status, react to the greater
deterioration, due to a higher health depreciation rate, by behaving in a healthier way. The
investments are encouraged by the fact that the marginal product of their investments will
be higher the more illness is severe.
The theoretical and the empirical results support the idea that life-style, as mea-
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sured by smoking, alcohol consumption, dietary habits, physical activity, prevention, obesity
and stress, is one of the driving factors for good health. Healthier habits are associated to
a higher probability of enjoying good health in both SAH-activity limitations and SAH-
blood pressure model.
Schooling represents a fundamental factor in determining the individual health too:
the empirical results show that more educated individuals are significantly less likely to re-
port a perceived bad health status. Moreover, education has a heavy impact on the health
behaviors: more educated individuals are often informed about the long-term consequences
of smoking, of lack of exercise of a bad nutrition. Hence, schooling helps people to choose a
healthier life-style by improving their knowledge of the relationship between health behav-
iors and health outcomes. Then, additional education trough education programs would
have positive eﬀects on the overall health of the population.
Another important factor that the above models predict is that family structure
has a great importance for individual behavior: those married are found to have healthier
life-styles than singles or divorced. Married men and women are less likely to have drinking
problems, are less likely to smoke and develop mental problems. These results are consistent
with the marriage protection hypothesis that states that the actual process of living with a
spouse confers benefits to both partners; the married state involves environmental, social,
and psychological factors that make it a healthier state than an unmarried one.
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Appendix I: Tables
Table 1: Variables Name and Definition
 Variables Name Variables Definition
ghealth 1 if current health is excellent, very good or good health, 0 otherwise
bloodpressure 1 if  has high blood pressure, 0 otherwise
ac_limit 1 if  has limited in any activities because of health problems, 0 otherwise
smoke 1 if  is current smoker, 0  if does not smoke
alcohol 1 if  is at risk for heavy drinking, 0 otherwise
diet 1 if consumes fruits/vegetables at least once per day, 0 otherwise
execise 1 if participates in physical activity in the last 30 days, 0 otherwise
obese 1 if  is at risk for overweight or obesity (BMI >25.0000), 0 otherwise
stress 1 if mental health (including stress) was not good, 0 otherwise
flushot 1 if has flu shot in the 12 months before the interview, 0 otherwise
hmo 1 if has health care coverage , 0 otherwise
element 1 if elementary school or Kindergarden, 0 otherwise
education 1 if had high_school, master or PhD degree 
high_sch 1 if attend high school or high school graduate, 0 otherwise
expenditure total annual health care expenditure
collg 1 if attend college or college graduate, 0 otherwise
married 1 if married, 0 otherwise
divorce 1 if divorced, 0 otherwise
widow 1 if widow, 0 otherwise
seprd 1 if sepatated,0 otherwise
never_married 1 if never married, 0 otherwise
unmar_couple 1 if member of an unmarried couple, 0 otherwise
alcohol 1 if unable to work, 0 otherwise
retd 1 if retired, 0 otherwise
stdnt 1 if student, 0 otherwise
home_make 1 if homemaker, 0 otherwise
out_work 1 if out of work, 0 otherwise
self_emp 1 if self-employed, 0 otherwise
white 1 if White,  0 otherwise
black 1 if  Black,  0 otherwise
1 if other race, 0 otherwise
69
Table 2: Summary Statistics
 Means St.Deviation
ghealth 0.8585 0.3485
bloodpressure  0.2573 0.4372
ac_limit  0.1508 0.3579
 smoke 0.2369 0.4252 
 alcohol 0.0458  0.2091
 diet 0.9668 0.1791
 exercise 0.7689 0.4215
obese 0.5513 0.4974 
 stress 0.2801 0.4491
flushot  0.3513  0.4774
hmo 0.9259  0.2619
element 0.0228 0.1493
high_sch 0.3672 0 .4821 
collg 0 .3173 0.4655
married 0.5268 0 .4993
divorce 0.1333 0.3399
widow  0.0995 0.2994
seprd 0.0236 0.1519
never_married 0.1997  0.3997 
unmar_couple 0.0171 0.1296
unable 0.0324 0.1769
 retrd 0.1993 0.39949 
stdnt 0 .0318 0.1754
 home_make 0 .0662 0.2486
out_work 0 .0256 0 .1581 
 self_emp 0.0679  0.2517
employed 0.5769 0.4941
white  0.6592 0.4740 
black  0.0584 0.2345
 other_race 0.2823 0.4501
age 46.8396  17.2957
male 0.4276 0.4948
 children  0.3812 0.4857
nummen  0.8966 0.6767 
numwomen 1.0071 0.5881
co_aqi 57.0767  17.7944 
physhlth 0.3002 0.4584
chronic_symp 0.2123 0.4089
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Table 3a) Estimatated Partial eﬀects SAH- Activity Limitations Model
 1) gheatlh 2) ac_limit  3) smoke 4) alcohol
smoke -0.1206 (0.000) 0.1668 (0.000)
alcohol 0.0520 (0.298) -0.0297 (0.684)
exercise 0.1297 (0.000) -0.3268 (0.000)
diet 0.0142 (0.801) -0.0135 (0.888)
obese -0.1002 (0.000) 0.1166 (0.001)
flu shot -0.0771 (0.007) 0.0582 (0.135)
stress -0.1049 (0.002) 0.2952 (0.000)
co_aqi -0.0031(0.047) 0.003 (0.001) -0.003 (0.000) -0.0007 (0.474)
hmo 0.0794 (0.000) 0.0049(0.884) -0.1567 (0.000) 0.0202 (0.667)
ac_limit -0.2287 (0.000)
element -0.2242 (0.000) 0.0272(0.585) -0.0085 (0867) 0.0533 (0.539)
collg 0.0919 (0.000) 0.01 (0.631) -0.1743 (0.000) -0.0701 (0.015)
divorce 0.1296 (0.000) 0.1469(0.000)
widow 0.0589 (0.062) -0.0736 (0.267)
seprd 0.1439 (0.001) 0.1803 (0.009)
never_married 0.0636 (0.004) 0.0814 (0.026)
unmar_couple 0.1362 (0.006) 0.1246 (0.119)
retd -0.0998 (0.001) 0.0181 (0.719)
stdnt -0.1753 (0.000) 0.0052 (0.274)
home_make -0.018 (0.563) -0.068 (80.274)
out_work 0.0907 (0.032) 0.0549 (0.433)
self_emp 0.0110 (0711) -0.0248 (0.636)
unable 0.2058 (0.000) -0.1935 (0.048)
black -0.0051(0.865) -0.0003 (0.992)
other race -0.0657 (0.003) -0.1099 (0.000)
age -0.0134 (0.000) 0.0099(0.000) -0.0049(0.000) -0.0043(0.010)
male -0.0174 (0.248) 0.0336 (0.057)
children -0.0499 (0.084) -0.0848 (0.034)
nummen 0.0438 (00.18) 0.0635 (0.007)
numwomen -0.0288 (0.167) 0.0000 (0.820)
physhlth -0.1805 (0.000)
chronic_symp -0.0963 (0.000)
p-values in parentheses.
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TABLE 3b: Estimatated Partial eﬀects SAH- Activity Limitations Model
 5) diet 6) exercise 7) flu shot 8) obese 9) stress
smoke
alcohol
exercise
diet
obese
flu shot
stress
co_aqi 0.0008(0.626) 0.0029(0.001) 0.0043(0.000) -0.0039(0.000) -0.0089(0.000)
hmo 0.0559 (0.030) 0.0493(0.017) 0.121(0.000) 0.0053 (0.815) -0.0549(0.040)
ac_limit
element 0.0107 (0.866) -0.1288 (0.001) -0.2421(0.080) -0.2351 (0.998) -0.245 (0.895)
collg 0.0742 (0.000) 0.1030 (0.000) -0.004 (0.787) -0.0549 (0.000) -0.0256 (0.105)
divorce -0.0087(0.733) -0.0129(0.482) -0.0758 (0.001) -0.0273(0.150) 0.0579 (0.009)
widow -0.0197(0.668) -0.0015 (0.946) -0.0421 (0.122) -0.0799 (0.001) 0.113 (0.000)
seprd -0.0205 (0.721) -0.0176 (0.636) -0.0215 (0.642) 0.0633 (0.087) 0.0728 (0.097)
never_married -0.1019 (0.000) -0.0243 (0.182) -0.0048 (0.822) -0.0109 (0.539) -0.0212 (0.329)
unmar_couple -0.0369 (0.581) 0.07 (0.122) -0.0364 (0.529) -0.0372 (0.414) 0.133 (0.006)
retd 0.0924 (0.005) 0.0236 (0.246) 0.1216 (0.000) 0.0603 (0.007) -0.0261 (0.367)
stdnt 0.0947 (0.030) 0.0736 (0.038) 0.0396 (0.341) -0.0799 (0.026) -0.0002 (0.996)
home_make 0.1047 (0.009) 0.0064 (0.782) -0.0658 (0.030) -0.0797 (0.001) 0.0339(0.225)
out_work -0.0207 (0.666) -0.0643 (0.080) -0.0411 (0.378) 0.0339 (0.352) 0.1637 (0.000)
self_emp 0.0441 (0.217) 0.0516 (0.024) -0.0989 (0.001) 0.0061 (0.794) 0.0093 (0.743)
unable -0.0806 0.107) -0.3121 (0.000) 0.0338 (0.408) 0.0738 (0.032) 0.286 (0.000)
black
other race
age 0.0024(0.416) -0.0075(0.000) 0.0121(0.000) 0.0058(0.000) -0.0107(0.000)
male
children 0.01816 (0.798) -0.0584 (0.126) -0.1118 (0.000) 0.0693 (0.024) 0.0036 (0.900)
nummen -0.0017 (0.968) 0.0683 (0.008) -0.0455 (0.026) 0.0695 (0.001) -0.035 (0.066)
numwomen 0.0339 (0.497) -0.0213 (0.437) 0.0056 (0.792) -0.0252 (0.253) 0.0394 (0.060)
physhlth
chronic_symp
p-values in parentheses.
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TABLE 4a: Estimatated Partial Eﬀects of SAH- Blood Pressure Model
 1)gheatlh 2) blood pressure 3) smoke 4)alcohol
smoke -0.1478 (0.000) -0.0313 (0.434)
alcohol 0.0644 (0.182) 0.1405 (0.040)
exercise 0.1381 (0.000) -0.0766 (0.060)
diet 0.0072 (0.900) 0.101 (0.192)
obese -0.0896 (0.001) 0.2155 (0.000)
flu shot -0.0672 (0.020) 0.1545 (0.000)
stress -0.1095 (0.001) 0.0977(0.007)
co_aqi -0.004 (0.012) 0.0003 (0.974) -0.003 (0.000) -0.0007 (0.470)
hmo 0.0767 (0.000) -0.0078 (0.816) -0.1576 (0.000) 0.0187 (0.690)
bloodpressure -0.0947 (0.003)
element -0.2171 (0.000) 0.0455 (0.331) -0.0040 (0.938) 0.0555 (0.521)
collg 0.0849 (0.000) -0.0694 (0.000) -0.1760 (0.000) -0.071 (0.014)
divorce 0.1259 (0.000) 0.1446 (0.000)
widow 0.0602 (0.058) -0.0742 (0.264)
seprd 0.1415 (0.001) 0.1811 (0.008)
never_married 0.062 (0.005) 0.0803 (0.028)
unmar_couple 0.1362 (0.006) 0.1297 (0.104)
retd -0.1086 (0.000) 0.0125 (0.803)
stdnt -0.1798 (0.000) -0.0772 (0.260)
home_make -0.0183 (0.560) -0.0686 (0.262)
out_work 0.0821 (0.053) 0.051 (0.466)
self_emp 0.0089 (0.767)  -0.0253 (0.628)
unable 0.1736 (0.000) -0.2044 (0.031)
black 0.0081(0.784) 0.1206 (0.000)
other race -0.041(0.048) 0.0241 (0.270)
age -0.0126 (0.000) 0.0185 (0.000) -0.0048 (0.000) -0.0042 (0.012)
male -0.0263 (0.080) 0.02 (0.212)
children -0.0544 (0.059) -0.0845 (0.034)
nummen 0.045 (0.016) 0.0649 (0.006)
numwomen -0.0271 (0.194) 0.0000 (0.830)
physhlth -0.2202 (0.000)
chronic_symp -0.1656 (0.000)
p-values in parentheses.
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TABLE 4b: Estimatated Partial Eﬀects of SAH- Blood Pressure Model
 5)diet 6)exercise 7) flu shot 8) obese 9) stress
smoke
alcohol
exercise
diet
obese
flu shot
stress
co_aqi 0.0009 (0.596) 0.0029(0.001) 0.0044 (0.000) -0.0039 (0.000) -0.0089 (0.000)
hmo 0.0566 (0.027) 0.0526 (0.011) 0.1179 (0.000) 0.0042 (0.853) -0.0583(0.030)
hgbloodpress
element 0.0084 (0.895) -0.139 (0.000) -0.2357 (0.078) -02284 (0.947) -0.2383 (0.760)
collg 0.0753 (0.000) 0.1046 (0.000) -0.0042 (0.775) -0.0557 (0.000) -0.0373 (0.086)
divorce -0.0057 (0.847) -0.0049 (0.790) -0.0779 (0.001) -0.0297 (0117) 0.0506 (0.024)
widow -0.0232 (0.615) -0.0016 (0.994) -0.0415 (0.125) -0.0797 (0.001) 0.1167 (0.000)
seprd -0.0127 (0.824) -0.0141 (0.710) -0.019  (0.680) 0.0632 (0.088) 0.0686 (0.123)
never_married -0.1048 (0.000) --0.0238 (0.197)-0.0083 (0.694) -0.0122 (0494) -0.0238(0.279)
unmar_couple -0.0276 (0.677) 0.0663 (0.149) -0.0306 (0597) -0.0345 (0.450) 0.1357 (0.006)
retd 0.0948 (0.004) 0.0387 (0.053) 0.1167 (0.000) -0.657 (0.003) -0.0418 (0.152)
stdnt 0.095 (0.028) 0.079 (0.026) 0.0383 (0.356) -0.0826 (0.022) -0.0077 (0849)
home_make 0.1027 (0.010) -0.0053 (0.822) -0.0656 (0.029) -0.0797 (0.001) 0.0339 (0.231)
out_work -0.0107 (0.820) -0.0437 (0.233) -0.045 (0.331) 0.0284 (0.436) 0.1505 (0.000)
self_emp 0.0443 (0.215) 0.0528 (0.022)  -0.1027 (0.001) 0.0042 (0.858) 0.0057 (0.843)
unable -0.0428 (0.322) -0.2236 (0.000) 0.0336 (0.378) 0.0583 (0.076) 0.2464 (0.000)
black
other race
age 0.0024 (0.430) -0.008 (0.000) 0.0123 (0.000) 0.006 (0.000) -0.0106 (0.000)
male
children 0.0273 (0.698) -0.0463 (0231) -0.1112 (0.000) 0.0670 (0.000) -0.0049 (0.864)
nummen -0.004 (0.927) 0.0652 (0.012) -0.044 (0.030) 0.0711 (0.001) -0.0327 (0.088)
numwomen 0.3 (0546) -0.2468 (0.375) 0.0069 (0.745) -0.0235 (0.745) 0.0425 (0.044)
physhlth
chronic_symp
p-values in parentheses.
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TABLE5: Estimated Correlation Coeﬃcients SAH-
-Activity Limitations Model
 correlation coefficients
rho31 0.1249 (0.0019
rho32 -0.1784 (0.004)
rho52 0.3249 (0.000)
rho92 -0.2795 (0.000)
rho43 0.2763 (0.000)
rho53 -0.1086 (0.014)
rho63 -0.1113 (0.000)
rho73 -0.1206 (0.000)
rho83 -0.0755 (0.000)
rho93 0.0762 (0.000)
rho74 -0.73 (0.022)
rho94 0.917 (0.007)
rho56 0.2488 (0.000)
rho76 0.0716(0.005)
rho86 -0.0656 (0.005)
rho96 -0.745(0.004)
rho97 -0.0511(0.044)
p-values in parentheses.
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TABLE 6: Estimated Correlation Coeﬃcients SAH-
-Blood Pressure Model
 correlation coefficients
rho31 0.1408 (0.008)
rho51 -0.1088 (0.043)
rho72 -0.1758 (0.004)
rho43 0.2838 (0.000)
rho53 -0.1705 (0.000)
rho63 -0.1057 (0.000)
rho73 -0.1299 (0.000)
rho83 -0.081 (0.000)
rho93 0.0734 (0.004)
rho74 -0.0772 (0.019)
rho94 0.0878 (0.007)
rho56 0.2505 (0.000)
rho76 0.0779 (0.002)
rho86 -0.0618 (0.008)
rho96 -0.0606 (0.018)
rho98 -0.0517 (0.041)
p-values in parentheses
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Chapter 3
On the Anatomy of Adverse
Selection in Health Insurance
Market: Evidence from the MEPS
3.1 Introduction
Since the seminal papers by Akerlof (1970) and by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
greater attention has been devoted to the problem of asymmetric information among agents.
An important form of asymmetric information between consumers and insurers is adverse
selection. In health insurance market adverse selection may occur when consumers’ true
health-cost risk is private information: insurance companies may know that consumers vary
in the level of risk, but, in principle, are not able to discern who are high and who are low
risk profile individuals within a group of potential insured. Identifying risks accurately is
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not an easy task and requires that insurance companies incur some costs. Insured parties
are heterogeneous in terms of expected costs and have more information about their risks.
Naturally, high-risk individuals are not encouraged to “reveal” their risk; this asymmetry is
a serious problem since may lead insurance companies to face large diﬀerences in expected
health costs due to heterogeneity in demographics and the incidence of illness.
As the insurers has imperfect information on the individuals’ health status, the
cover and the premium will be set somewhere between what is required by the low and the
high risk profile users. However, low risk users may feel they are paying too much with
respect to their needs. Low risk individuals tend to drop out of the risk pool, then, the
average risk in the pool rises causing premium to rise and yet more people to drop out and
so on. This may leave to the case in which only high risk profile individuals buy insurance
and pay “average” rate.
To counteract to this problem, insurance companies may oﬀer separate contracts
with diﬀerent coverage and prices, making claimant pay part of the claim (with coinsurance
rate, deductible etc.) so that individuals should reveal their risks. Hence, risky individuals
who expect high health care costs would tend to purchase insurance with higher premium
but lower excesses since they are more likely to be claiming on a regular basis. On the other
hand lower risk users, who expect low costs, would prefer a less complete insurance, with
a lower premium and a higher excess in the unlikely event that they have to claim.1 The
phenomenon described above is known as ex ante adverse selection” (Fang et.al, 2006)2.
1This form of allocation has been proved superior (in terms of economic eﬃciency) to that in which a
mean price is paid by all individuals. The main work in this area is attributed to Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976).
2This is also known as adverse selection eﬀect a` la Rothschild-Stiglitz: high risk agents, knowing they are
more likely to have an accident, self-select by choosing contracts entailing a more comprehensive coverage.
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The “positive correlation property” between the individual riskiness and the com-
pleteness of a health insurance plan, which characterize this phenomenon, forms the basis
for our empirical test for adverse selection. This test is conducted by using data from
the 2003/2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey — Household Component (MEPS-HC)
in conjunction with the previous year’s National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). Many
empirical work use information on coinsurance rate, health insurance benefits, stop-loss and
deductible to measure generosity of health insurance plan (see, for instance, Browne and Do-
erpinghaus, 1993). Unfortunately our data do not contain information about the insurance
contract ; hence, we measure health insurance plan completeness by using health insurance
reimbursement that is the diﬀerence between total health expenditure and out-of-pocket
expenditure on health care paid by consumers.
Health insurance reimbursement, however, is only defined for a subset of
individuals from the overall population since we observe it only for those who partici-
pate in insurance and have positive health care expenditure. Thus, the model may suﬀer
from sample selection bias and straightforward regression analysis may lead to inconsistent
parameters estimate. Another problem that arises from the estimation is the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity in the equations of interest. Wooldridge (1995) has proposed an
estimator which deals with both sources of estimation bias. We extend this estimation
method to the case in which selectivity is due to two sources rather than one (participation
in insurance and participation in health care expenditure). The nature of the test is similar
to the one in Browne and Doerpinghaus (1993).
We find no systematic relation between illness of individuals and insurance choice.
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We think that a possible explanation can be found in the so called ”cream skimming”
practise: health plans may have an incentive to alter their policy to attract the healthy
and repeal the sick (Newhouse, 1996; Ellis, 1997). Then, individuals enrolled are relatively
healthy people and this lead to the failure of the correlation test.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys
the empirical related literature. Section 3 describes the data and variables. In Section 4
we perform the empirical analysis, explain the test in detail and present our main results.
Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion. The definition of the variables, descriptive
statistics and tables with estimation coeﬃcients are in Appendix .
3.2 Related Literature
There is substantial empirical literature examining adverse selection in health in-
surance markets. However, there is conflicting evidence on the presence of adverse selection:
the results are mixed. We briefly summarize these studies here.
Cameron and Trivedi (1991), for instance, use Australian data to estimate a logit
model for the choice between a standard package and a more generous insurance plan. They
find no significant eﬀect of health condition variables on insurance choice. Browne and Do-
erpinghaus (1993) find evidence for adverse selection: their results show that low and high
risks purchase a pooling insurance policy and low risks subsidize the insurance purchase
of high risk insured individuals. This supports the prediction by Miyazaki’s (1977) theory
of adverse selection. Cardon and Hendel (2001) test for a correlation between health care
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spending and insurance coverage using a two-stage model of the demand for health insur-
ance. In their setup, individuals first receive a private signal that is correlated with their
future health. Based on this signal individuals make their choice about how much insurance
to purchase. In the second stage, individuals consume health care. Their empirical analyses
revealed that the joint insurance/health care consumption decision is largely explained by
observed characteristics (such as income, education etc.) rather than unobserved health
status. Thus, they conclude that apparently there is no private information that insureds
can use against the insurers and hence no adverse selection.
Bajari et al. (2006) use the Health Retirement Study to estimate a structural
model of the demand for health insurance and medical care. They find evidence of moral
hazard but not of adverse selection. Goldman et al. (2006) estimate independent eﬀects
of medical and drug benefits on plan selection. They find that while generosity of the
medical benefit played an important role in choosing a plan, choices did not vary significantly
by health status. In contrast, their data support a significant correlation between health
status and plans with generous drug benefits: sicker individuals tend to enroll in plans with
generous drug benefits, while healthier choose less generous plan. Based on their findings,
they assert that drug coverage may be more susceptible to adverse selection than medical
coverage .
In insurance markets other than health, evidence for adverse selection is consid-
erably contradictory too. Puelz and Snow (1994) presented empirical evidence of adverse
selection in the market for automobile collision insurance. Using data from a private in-
surer, they find strong evidence of adverse selection in the insurer’s portfolio. Chiappori
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and Salanie´ (2000) use data on contracts and accidents to examine the extent of asymmet-
ric information in the French market for automobile insurance. They examine a relatively
homogenous group of drivers with less than four years’ driving experience. Their test do
not reveal evidence of risk-related adverse selection. They find that when choosing their
automobile insurance contracts, individuals behave as though they had no better knowledge
of their risk than insurance companies, which is in contrast with what the adverse selection
hypothesis would require.
Cawley and Philipson (1999) test for adverse selection in the market for life insur-
ance; they first show that the death rate among those who purchase life insurance is lower
than those who do not, moreover they find that who expect to die soon do not buy more
complete life insurance plan. This is clearly in contrast with the basic adverse selection
theory.
Finally, Makki and Somwaru (2001) analyze farmers’ choices of crop insurance
contracts. Their analysis oﬀers empirical evidence of adverse selection by showing that
high-risk farmers are more likely to select revenue insurance contracts and higher coverage
levels with respect to low—risk farmers.
Most of the studies we have come across have used discrete choice models to rep-
resent the health insurance purchase decision. They have used logit or probit specifications
to analyze a decision where the dependent variable has two outcomes: buying or not buy-
ing health insurance. Few studies have gone to the next level and tried to explain which
factors aﬀect the extent of insurance purchase. Moreover, in most of the studies that test
for adverse selection two important estimation issues such as unobserved heterogeneity and
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selection bias, are typically treated separately3. The aim of this paper is to find factors
which aﬀect the extent of insurance purchase with particular attention to individuals’ risk
profile. In our model, we control for selection bias and at the same time for unobserved
heterogeneity issue. The simultaneous account taken of both possible sources of bias seems
to be relatively new for this kind of application.
3.3 Data and Variables
We use data from the 2003/2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey — Household
Component (MEPS-HC) and 2002 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). MEPS is an
on-going survey sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).
MEPS provides a nationally representative sample of US civilian non-institutionalized popu-
lation. MEPS is self-reported and contains detailed information on health care consumption
and demographics including age, sex, marital status, income, work status and geographic
location. In addition data contain information on the respondents’ health status, health
conditions, health charges and payments, access to care, health conditions, health insurance
coverage.
Each year’s sample for MEPS is drawn from respondents to the previous year’s
NHIS that is conducted annually by the National Centers for Health Statistics (NCHS),
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). NHIS provides rather detailed informa-
tion about health status, diseases, life-style, education and other individual characteristics.
3It is often mathematically complex to combine these two issues together, a large burden of computer
programming and a set of strong distributional assumptions are needed for the combination. The model
presented in this paper, however, is estimated with the common statistical software STATA 9. Also the
statistical assumptions needed for Wooldridge’s model in this paper is relatively weaker than the other
methods.
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We use the 2002 NHIS in conjunction with 2003/2004 MEPS with MEPS as our primary
database because it contains information on health insurance reimbursement, which is the
dependent variable of interest in this paper, as well as detailed information on health in-
surance.
After correcting for the missing values, the sample contains 890 individuals
resulting in 1780 observations. Observations containing veterans and individuals who are
covered by Champus/ ChampVa insurance are removed from the data set since their medical
services demand and access to medical services diﬀer distinctly from the general population4.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for demographics and health insurance infor-
mation. The sample of 1780 individuals is divided into insured and uninsured. Only 8% of
the sample is uninsured. As showed in Table 2, uninsured are younger, and poorer. Health
care expenditure is important relative to total income, around 11% for insured and 13% for
uninsured. The average expenditure in the whole sample is 4,300 $. The distribution of the
expenditures is highly skewed, as expected. Insured spent 50% more in health care than
uninsured (4314$ versus 2001 $).
Table 2 shows that 89% of insured report that their health is good versus the
4The health care system in US is characterized by: private insurance, Medicare and Medicaid and Military
health insurance.
Private medical insurance is the largest component of the health care system: insured pay a fee-for-service
reimbursement basis; they pay directly the medical treatments and be reimbursed at a later date by the
insurer. Medicare is a program funded by the government through social security payments. It was created
mainly for people 65 years of age and older, some disabled people under 65 years of age, and people with
end-stage renal disease. This scheme is extremely basic with very few services oﬀered with much of the cost
still having to be met by the patient. Since Medicare has a number of gaps in coverage, most of the enrolled
buys own supplemental insurance coverage.
Medicaid is funded jointly by the federal and state authorities and is available for individuals of all ages
and families with low incomes and resources who cannot aﬀord proper medical care.
Champus (now known as Tricare) is a health care benefits program for active duty and retired members
of the military.
ChampVa is a health care benefits program for permanently disabled veterans and their dependents.
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82% of uninsured. Insured behave in a healthier way: the percentage of smoker and the
percentage of heavy alcohol consumers are lower; on average they present a lower BMI, and
they practice physical activity more often than uninsured.
At first sight, it seems that there are no symptoms consistent with adverse se-
lection: a substantial fraction of the sample is insured and among insured about 90% of
individuals enjoy good health5.
3.3.1 Risk Profile Variables
To perform the correlation test, first we classify individuals as being high and low
risk profile individuals. Individuals are classified as being low-risk if their health status is
good. As a measure of health status we use two indicators: a subjective and an objective
one. In particular, following Berger and Leigh (1988), we choose blood pressure as an
indicator of overall health, since it is the most important predictor of cardiovascular disease
which is the greatest killer in the U.S. We create a binary variable (hypertension) that takes
value one if respondents suﬀer from high blood pressure and zero otherwise. We classify
individuals as high-risk profile individuals if they report that they suﬀer from hypertension.
Moreover, we use as a measure of overall health SAH (self-assessed health)6, which is a five
5A possible explanation of the higher percentage of healthy individuals among insured can be found in
the insurance plan characteristics. Plans may have been designed to distort their oﬀering to attract the
healthy and repel the sick.
Seeking favorable risk is often referred as cream skimming. These strategic behavior can take a variety
of forms including designing insurance benefits packages in such a way as to be more attractive to healthy
persons than unhealthy by, for instance, excluding particular prescription drugs or oﬀering health club
memberships which appeal to the low risks. The result is that individuals enrolled in health insurance are
relatively healthy people.
6Self- reported health status is a very good indicator of overall health. It has been showed to be an
important predictor of subsequent mortality and medical services use, and is widely used as a measure for
the stock of health in pervious studies that analyze empirical determinants of health. ( Contoyannis and
Jones 2004, Contoyannis et al. 2004).
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category variable rating from poor to excellent. We construct a binary variable (health)
with the value one if individuals report that their health status is excellent, very good, good
and zero otherwise (fair or poor). Then, we classify as high-risk individuals those whose
self-reported health is fair or poor.
In addition, individuals are classified as being characterized by a high-risk profile
if they follow an unhealthy life-style. Life-style variables measure the eﬀort that individuals
use to prevent an illness and at the same time they are good predictor of future illness.
The behavioral variables employed are indicator of smoking, alcohol consumption, physical
activity practice and BMI7. Individuals are classified as being characterized by a high risk
profile if they smoke, usually consume heavy drinks, practice vigorous physical activity less
than once per week and if their reported BMI is higher than 25.0000.
3.3.2 Other Characteristics
In addition to the health and life-style indicators, the independent variables, used
to control for diﬀerences in policy, can be grouped in the following categories: demographic
variables (age, sex, race), socioeconomic variables (education, marital status, employment
status, income) preferences (risk aversion). Moreover, we control for total annual expen-
diture, out-of-pocket annual premium and whether individuals suﬀer from any form of
disabilities that limit their activities (such as working, studying etc.).
Because older individuals tend to use more medical services and may have higher
medical expenditure, we expect a positive relationship between age and the amount of
7BMI (Body Max Index) is used as measure of obesity. Obesity is considered a risk factor for several
diseases. It is often associated with aspects of an individual’s life-style such as an insuﬃcient physical activity
and inappropriate nutrition. Those who are a BMI > or equal than 25.0000 are overweight and at risk of
obesity and are expected to have poorer health.
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reimbursement. Since males tend to use less medical services than females we expect a
negative correlation between males and health insurance reimbursement. A positive rela-
tionship between the variables black and other race and the completeness of coverage is
expected because of the higher need of medical services among non whites caused by a
higher morbidity rate.
According to the ”marriage protection hypothesis” (which states that the actual
process of living with a spouse confers health benefits to both partners) we expect that
married people tend to use less medical services. Thus, we expect a negative correlation
between the variable ”married” and the dependent variable that measure the generosity of
health plan.
The variables which are indicators of education, employment status and income
are included in the analysis to account for diﬀerences, other than risk type, which may
aﬀect the amount of insurance purchase by the insured. We expect a negative relationship
between the degree of education and the amount of insurance purchased: individuals with
a higher level of schooling are observed to be healthier than the others8. Hence, we expect
that individuals with a higher degree of education use less medical services and purchase
a less complete insurance plan. Similarly, the coeﬃcients for income and employed are
expected to be negative.
We include also a measure of risk aversion. Higher risk aversion translates into
8One explanation of this empirical regularity is that education increases the productivity of producing
health i.e. more health can be produced for the same inputs (Gerdtham et al., 1999, Berger and Leigh,
1989). Schooling helps people choose healthier life-styles by improving their knowledge of the relationship
between health behaviors and health outcomes. (Kenkel, 1991). A more educated person may have more
knowledge about the harmful eﬀects of cigarette smoking, alcohol consumption or about what constitutes
an appropriate, healthy diet. Furthermore, schooling increases information about the importance of having
regular exams or screening tests to prevent an illness or at least to minimize disease.
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a willingness to pay more to eliminate financial risk. For a given premium, we expect a
positive coeﬃcient for the variable that measures risk aversion since more risk-averse insured
will be willing to tolerate higher deductible, coinsurance rate, stop-loss than someone who
is less risk-averse9.
The variable that we use as indicator of limited activity controls for the portion of
risk observable to the insurer. The activity limitations indicator is expected to be positively
related to the generosity of the health insurance plan, because being limited increases the
likelihood of need for medical care.
3.4 Estimation Strategies and Empirical Results
3.4.1 Wooldridge Two-Step Estimation
To test for diﬀerences in insurance purchases by high and low risk profile indi-
viduals we use as a measure of completeness of coverage the natural logarithm of health
care reimbursement (total health care expenditure paid by private insurance, Medicare and
Medicaid. The assumption of lognormality better fits the expenditure reimbursement and
has precedents (see, for example, Keeler et al., 1977, Browne and Doerpinghaus, 1993).
Health insurance reimbursement is only defined for a subset of individuals from
the overall population since we observe it only for those who participate in insurance and
face positive health care expenditure. Hence the model suﬀers from sample selection bias
9Chiappori and Salanie` in their recent work ”Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets”
stressed the importance of including risk aversion among explanatory variables:
[... more risk averse drivers tend to both buy more insurance and to drive cautiously; this would even
suggest a negative correlation between insurance coverage and accident frequency...]. Then, if do not con-
trol for individuals risk aversion, we may obtain spurious correlation between individuals’ risk profile and
completeness of coverage.
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and straightforward regression analysis may lead to inconsistent parameters estimate.
Another problem that arises from the estimation is the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity in the equations of interest. Wooldridge (1995) has proposed an estimator
which deals with both sources of estimation bias; this estimator requires panel data and
produces consistent parameter estimates under a set of assumptions. It does not impose
distributional assumptions about the error terms but requires specifying the functional form
of the conditional mean of the individual eﬀects in the structural equation. We extend this
method to the case in which selectivity is due to two sources rather than one.
We start by sketching Wooldridge’s (1995) sample selection model with one selec-
tion criterion, then we present a specification of the model in which the selection process is
based on two selection criteria rather than one.
Following M.Rochina-Barrachina (1999), we consider the following problem:
d∗it = zitγ + µi + uit
dit = 0 if d∗it ≤ 0
dit = 1 if d∗it > 0
(3.1)
y∗it = xitβ + αi + εit
yit = y∗it if dit = 1
yit not observed otherwise
(3.2)
where equation (3.1) defines the selection rule while equation (3.2) is the primary equation.
i (i = 1, ...n) denotes the individuals while t (t = 1, ..., t) denotes the panel. xit and zit
are vector of exogenous variables. The dependent variable in the primary equation, yit,
is observed only for the observations satisfying the selection rule. Terms µi and αi are
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fixed eﬀects10. Wooldridge suggests employing Chamberlain (1980) characterization, by
assuming the conditional mean of the individual eﬀects in the selection equation as a linear
projections on the leads and lags of observable variables:
µi = zi1δ1 + ...+ zitδt + ci (3.3)
where ci is a random component. By substituting Chamberlain characterization into the
selection equation yields:
d∗it = zitγ + zi1δ1 + ...+ zitδt + vit (3.4)
where vit = ci+ uit. vit is distributed independently of zit and is normally distributed with
zero mean and σ2 variance. The regression function of αi on zit and vit is linear, accordingly:
E [αi |zit, vit ] = xi1ψ1 + ...+ xitψt + φtvit (3.5)
We do not observe vit, but only the binary indicator dit. Then, we replace E [αi |zit, vit ]
with:
E [αi |zit, dit = 1] = xi1ψ1 + ...+ xitψt + φtE [vit |zit, dit = 1] (3.6)
Wooldridge assumes that εit is mean independent of zit conditional on vit and its conditional
mean is linear on vit:
E [εit |zit, vit ] = E [εit |vit ] = ρtvit (3.7)
By the Law of Iterated Expectation:
E [εit |zit, dit = 1] = ρtE [vit |zit, dit = 1] (3.8)
10The individual eﬀects are assumed to be the fixed eﬀets rather than the random eﬀects.
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From the above assumption, Wooldridge derives an explicit expression for
E [αi + εit |zit, dit = 1] = E [αi |zit, dit = 1] +E [εit |zit, dit = 1] =
= xi1ψ1 + ...+ xitψt + (φt + ρt)E [vit |zit, dit = 1]
(3.9)
where
E [vit |zit, dit = 1] = λ (zi1γ1 + ...+ zitγt) (3.10)
So, for each period, Wooldridge suggests to estimate a cross-sectional probit model for
participation and compute the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR), then, estimate the structural
equation:
yit = xi1ψ1 + ...+ xitψt + xitβ + (φt + ρt)λ (zi1γ1 + ...+ zitγt) (3.11)
by using fixed eﬀect OLS or pooled OLS for the sample for which dit = 1 (Vella, 1998).
Concerning the health insurance reimbursement model, we consider the following
characterization of Wooldridge’s sample selection model where selectivity bias is a function
of two indices:
d∗it1 = zit1γ1 + µi1 + uit1
dit1 = 0 if d
∗
it1 ≤ 0
dit1 = 1 if d
∗
it1 > 0
(3.12)
d∗it2 = zit2γ2 + µi2 + uit2
dit2 = 0 if d
∗
it2 ≤ 0
dit2 = 1 if d
∗
it2 > 0
(3.13)
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y∗it = xitβ + αi + εit
yit = y∗it if dit = 1
yit not observed otherwise
(3.14)
Let dit1 be an unobserved variable denoting insurance participation decision and dit2 an
unobserved variable denoting health care expenditure participation decision. zit1 , zit2 and
xit are vector of exogenous variables. yit denotes the natural logarithm of health insurance
reimbursement. yit is observed only for the sample for which dit1 = 1 and dit2 = 1. Terms
µi1 , µi2 and αi are fixed eﬀects.
Sample selection is now based on two criteria. The method of estimation relies
crucially on the relationship between vit1 and vit2
11, in particular, the estimation depends
on whether the two error terms are independent or correlated, that is whether or not
Cov (vit1 , vit2) = 0. The simplest case is when the disturbances are uncorrelated (Mad-
dala,1983, Vella, 1998). If Cov (vit1 , vit2) = 0 we can easily extend Wooldridge’s two-step
estimation method to this model. The correction term to include as regressor in the primary
equation is:
E [εit |zit, dit1 = 1, dit2 = 1] = ρt1λ1
¡
zi11γ11 + ...+ zit1γt1
¢
+
+ρt2λ2
¡
zi12γ12 + ...+ zit2γt2
¢ (3.15)
Then, we estimate the following model:
yit = xi1ψ1 + ...+ xitψt + xitβ +
¡
φt1 + ρt1
¢
λ1
¡
zi11γ11 + ...+ zit1γt1
¢
+
+
¡
φt2 + ρt2
¢
λ2
¡
zi12γ12 + ...+ zit2γt2
¢ (3.16)
11From Chamberlain trasformation of the individual eﬀects: vit1 = ci1 + uit1 and vit2 = ci2 + uit2
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The procedure consists in first estimating, for each period, by two single a cross-
sectional probit model, the selection equation one and the selection equation two. Than,
the two corresponding Inverse Mills Ratio can be imputed and included as correction terms
in the primary equation. Thus, by fixed eﬀect or pooled OLS12, estimate of the resulting
primary equation corrected for selection bias can be done for the sample for which dit1 = 1
and dit2 = 1.
In the case vit1 and vit2 are correlated, so that Cov (vit1 , vit2) = σ
2, [. . . the
expression get very messy. . . ] (Maddala, 1983) and we have to use for each period cross-
sectional bivariate probit methods to estimate γit1 and γit2 . Further,
E
£
εit
¯¯
zit1 , zit2dit1 = 1, dit2 = 1
¤
= ρt1M12 + ρt2M21 (3.17)
where Mij = (1− σ12)−1 (Pi − σ12Pj) and
Pj =
Z zit1γt1
−∞
Z zit2γt2
−∞
vit1vit2 f(vit1 ,vit2)dvit1dvit2
F(zit1γt1 ,zit2γt2)
.13
Bivariate Probit Model for Care Expenditure and Insurance
To test whether vit1 and vit2 are correlated we run for each year a “preliminary”
bivariate probit between insurance and health care expenditure participation. In our model
the dependent variable employed to predict the probability of facing positive health care
12In this analysis fixed eﬀect however presents a significant limitation with the respect to pooled OLS : we
can not assess the eﬀect of variables that do not vary very much within group: i.e. degree of education, race,
region, etc. that can impact significantly the health insurance reimbursement. Also, explanatory variables
whose change across time is constant — e.g. age — can not be included.
13There is only one cross-sectional example in the literature that is due to Fishe et. al.(1981). They
estimated the selection equations by bivariate probit method and evaluated the above expression by numerical
methods.
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expenditure is a binary variable that takes value one if individuals incur in positive health
care expenditure during the year of interview, and zero otherwise.
The independent variables employed can been categorized into three dimensions:
need for care (need to see a specialist or have treatments or tests and an indicator of health
status14), predisposition to use health services (age, sex, marital status, race) and enabling
factors (education, insurance, income, employment status, region and residential location15).
Among enabling factor, we consider insurance participation. An insured individual, in
fact, may consume more medical services and have a greater expenditure compared to an
uninsured one (moral hazard eﬀect, Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968). In this study, the situation
is further complicated by the fact that insurance participation itself may be aﬀected by the
likelihood of having positive health expenditure. The choice of insurance coverage may be
aﬀected by planned medical expenditure and expectations about medical care utilization
(adverse selection eﬀect).
To test the potential endogeneity of health insurance and at the same time whether
the covariance between health insurance choice and health expenditure participation is
significantly diﬀerent of zero, we run for each year a cross sectional recursive bivariate
probit models (Maddala, 1999).
For each period, the recursive structure builds on a first reduced form equation
for the potentially endogenous dummy measuring insurance participation and a second
14We adopt as indicator of health status the objective measure of health that is ”hypertension” since it
seems to work better.
15The variables MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) and the indicators of regions control for medical cost
diﬀerences between metropolitan and no-metropolitan statistical area, as well as by region of the country.
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structural form equation determining the expenditure participation:
d∗it1 = zi11γ11 + ...+ zit1γt1 + vit1
(3.18)
d∗it2 = zi12γ12 + ...+ zit2γt2 + vit2 =
= zi12γ12 + ...+ dit1 ζ + witξ + vit2
(3.19)
where d∗it1 and d
∗
it2 are latent variables, and dit1 and dit2 are dichotomous variables observed
according to the rule: 


ditj = 0 if d
∗
itj ≤ 0
ditj = 1 if d
∗
itj > 0
; j = 1, 2 (3.20)
zit1 , the lags of zitj and wit are vector of exogenous variables, γ and ξ are parameter vectors,
ζ is a scalar parameter. The dependent variable dit1 used to predict the probability of being
insured is again a dummy variable that takes value one if respondents are insured and
zero otherwise. The vector of explanatory variables zit1 used to predict the probability of
being insured includes both exogenous variables that are determinants of health expenditure
and personal attributes that are only determinative of health insurance choice16 (i.e. risk
aversion). We assume that, for each period, the error terms vit1 and vit2 are distributed as
bivariate normal, with zero mean and variance covariance matrix Σ. Σ has values of 1 on
the leading diagonal and correlations ρ12 = ρ21 as oﬀ-diagonal elements:


vit1
vit2

 ∼ IIDN




0
0

 ,


1 ρ12
ρ21 1



 (3.21)
16Estimation of a recursive bivariate probit model requires some considerations for the identification of
the model parameters: at least one of the insurance equation exogenous variables has not to be included
in the expenditure equation as explanatory variable (Maddala, 1983). Following Maddala’s approach we
include among explanatory variables in the insurance equation a measure of risk aversion assuming that risk
aversion has direct eﬀect on insurance choice while it has only an indirect eﬀect on health care expenditure
through insurance participation. In addition we exclude from insurance participation equation ”need for
care” variable to avoid causality problems with the dependent variable.
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In the above setting, the exogeneity condition is stated in terms of the correlation
coeﬃcient, which can be interpreted as the correlation between the unobservable explana-
tory variables of the two diﬀerent equations. The two selection equations can be estimated
separately as single probit models only in the case of independent error terms vit1 and vit2
i.e. the coeﬃcient ρjk is not significantly diﬀerent of zero (k = 1, 2). If the error terms
vit1 and vit2 are independent we can deal with the above model as independent equations
(Maddala, 1983) and apply the model in the equation (3.16)17.
Table 3 shows the correlation coeﬃcients and the p-value for each year sample:
the null hypothesis of Cov
¡
vit1 , vit2
¢
= 0 is not rejected; hence, we can deal with the model
in the equation (3.16) and compute Inverse Mills Ratio by using the two selection equations
as single probit models. Moreover, Cov
¡
vit1 , vit2
¢
= 0 (the error terms vit1 and vit2 are
independent) does not support adverse selection in insurance choice: no unobservable that
aﬀect the health care expenditure significantly aﬀect insurance participation, while being
insured has a positive influence on the probability of facing positive health care expendi-
ture(see Tables 4 and 5). It is worth noting that while socioeconomic variables influence
the probability of being insured they do not impact significantly the probability of positive
expenditure (see Tables 4 and 5)18.
17The estimation of the model is carried out using STATA 9 software by which it is possible to run a
bivariate probit with the command biprobit. STATA provides the statistics z = ρˆSρˆ
to test the hypothesis
H : ρ = 0. If the error terms are independent the bivariate probit estimation is equivalent to the separate
probit estimations.
18We have tested for multicollinearity in both probit models (health care expenditure and insurance model)
by using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance(1/VIF)(Wooldridge, 2000). We find that VIF
for all the independent variables in both the equations are quite low. Therefore, we can safely assume that
there are no problems of multicollinerity.
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3.4.2 Structural Equation Estimation
Tables 6, 7 and 8 show the coeﬃcients for the structural insurance reimbursement
equation estimated using pooled OLS specification. The test for completeness of insur-
ance coverage purchased by high risk profile individuals includes three pooled OLS models
each of which contains a diﬀerent measure of risk: a subjective measure of health (self-
assessed health), an objective measure of health (hypertension) and independent variables
that measure the individual life-style19. In each model the dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of health insurance reimbursement.
We find a little evidence for adverse selection: table 6 shows that the coeﬃcient
estimate for the variable ”health” is negative but is not statistically significant. Life-style
variables do not influence the choice of health plan with exception of the variable ”exercise”
that, however, presents a positive coeﬃcient. Table 7 shows that the variable that measures
whether individuals suﬀer from high blood pressure is positively and significantly correlated
with the health insurance reimbursement. The reason of this positive correlation may be
found in the fact that more than half of all hypertensive in our sample are covered by
Medicaid or Medicare. Medicare and Medicaid are essentially universal health insurance
programs for this segment of the population. However, these programs present a number
of gaps in coverage: for instance, despite Medicare and Medicaid have a prescription drug
benefit, often people face restrictions in the number of covered medications. Since these
restrictions, many people will exceed the initial drug benefit cap and may remain at risk
for inadequate blood pressure control. (Duru et al., 2007). Hence, many hypertensives are
19We have constructed three diﬀerent sub-models since the three measures of risk are strongly correlated
and may generate problems of multicollinearity.
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forced to buy their own supplemental insurance coverage which oﬀers hypertensive prescrip-
tion drugs; normally, those plans are more comprehensive than Medicare and Medicaid.
As expected the variable that measures whether respondents suﬀer from disabilities
which limit their activities presents a positive and significant coeﬃcients. The variable
that measures individual risk aversion presents a positive sign but the coeﬃcient is not
statistically significant.
Concerning the variables that measure total income, education and employment
status, the parameter estimates have the expected sign, but only the parameter for ed-
ucation is statistically significant. In the empirical literature we can observe that higher
educational degree is often associated to a better health status; in particular it seems that
education improves indirectly health status by helping people choose healthier life-styles
and by improving their knowledge of the relationship between health behaviors and health
outcomes (Kenkel, 1991). Then, people with more schooling tend to choose less complete
insurance plans since they tend to enjoy good health.
Other than regular variables, two independent variables here are the IMR (Inverse
Mills Ratio) which have been estimated from the first and second probit selection equations.
When added to the outcome equation as additional regressors, they measure the sample
selection eﬀect due to lack of observations on the non-health insurance purchasers and
non-health expenditure participants. These variables should be statistically significant to
justify the use of Wooldridge two-step estimation. Since in our models they are statistically
significant there may be sample selection problem in the data and we need to use Wooldridge
method (Bath and Jain, 2006).
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3.5 Summary and Conclusions
We have used the 2003/2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey in conjunctions
with the 2002 National Health Interview Survey to asses whether US health insurance mar-
ket is aﬀected by adverse selection. We have conducted a positive correlation test which
estimates the correlation between the amount of insurance an individual buys and his ex-
post risk experience. We have employed three measures of risk: perceived health status,
blood pressure and individuals’ life-style. In addition, we have controlled for a number of
enrollee characteristics including age, sex, race, education and family size which are used
in pricing insurance policies. As indicator of generosity and completeness of health plan,
we have employed health care expenditure reimbursement which measures the diﬀerence
between total health care expenditure and out-of-pocket expenditure on health care paid
by consumers. Since health insurance reimbursement is only defined for those who partic-
ipate in insurance and have positive health care expenditure the model is estimated using
Wooldridge’s (1995) two step estimation procedure. We have extended this method to the
case in which selectivity is due to two sources rather than one.
The evidence for adverse selection seems to be lacking. Our findings do not support
the existence of a systematic relation between illness of individuals and insurance choice.
There is no separating equilibrium: high risk individuals do not purchase more complete
insurance than low risk profile individuals.
The absence of correlation between individuals’ risk-profile and completeness of
health insurance can be explained by the fact that individuals may choose a health insurance
plan based not only on their expected health status but also on their preferences such
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as the geographic location, whether they can continue to see doctors with whom they
have already established relationships, whether friends recommended plans etc. If such
preferences exert suﬃcient influence, risk-based selection is a minor consideration; as they
become less important, adverse selection increases.
Arguably, another explanation for these results may be found in health plans
risk selection practise. The distribution of health expenditure is highly skewed: only a
small fraction of individuals account for most of health care spending. Because of this,
insurers may have a strong incentives to distort their oﬀering to avoid enrollment of high
cost individuals. Then, insurers may practice a kind of ”reverse adverse selection”: they
would try to increase their profits by refusing to sign contracts with the worst risks in an
insurance pool (see Siegelman, 2004 ). These strategic behavior can take a variety of forms
including: designing insurance benefits packages in such a way as to be more attractive to
healthy people than unhealthy ones for instance by excluding particular prescription drugs,
oﬀering numerous pediatrician ( families with children are better risks) or by excluding
cancer specialist visits. If health plans cream healthy individuals, those who are enrolled in
health insurance are relatively healthy people and the correlation between risk- profile and
the generosity of health insurance plans becomes insignificant.
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Appendix I: Tables
Table 1: Variables Name and Definition
 Variables Name Variables Defin ition
age age in years
male 1 if male, 0 otherwise
white 1 if white, 0 otherwise
black 1 if black, 0 otherwise
other_race 1 if other race, 0 otherwise
northeast 1 if lives in Northeast region, 0 otherwise
midweast 1 if lives in Midweast region, 0 otherwise
west 1 if lives in  West region, 0 otherwise
south 1 if lives in  South region, 0 otherwise
msa 1 if lives in Metropolitan Statistical Area, 0 otherwise
income total annual income
employed 1 if employed, 0 otherwise
education 1 if had high_school, master or PhD degree 
when entered in MEPS, 0 otherwise
expenditure total annual health care expenditure
reimbursement total annual health care expenditure paid by insurance
family size family size
married 1 if married, 0 otherwise
health 1 if current health is excellent, very good, good, 0 otherwise
activity limitations 1 if has limited in any activities because health
 problems, 0 otherwise
hypertention 1 if suffers from high blood pressure, 0 otherwise
smoke 1 if is current smoker, 0 otherwise
alcohol 1 ifcorrent consumes heavy alcohol, 0 otherwise
execise 1 if participates in vigorous physical activity 
at least once at week, 0 otherwise
obese body max index >= 25.0000
need care 1 if needs for care during the year of interview, 0 otherwise
insured 1 if insured, 0 otherwise
risk aversion 1 if is not likely to take risk, 0 otherwise
mills1 mills ratio insurance partecipation
mills2 mills ratiohealth care expenditure partecipation
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
 All Insured Uninsured
Age 48.18  48.58 43,30
Male 0.317  0.316 0.331    
Income  38,062.86   39,924.13     15,563.32    
Total health care expenditure 4,120.202 4,295.44 2,001.882
Annual premium  1,736.688    
Northeast 0.168 0.177 0.066   
South 0.351  0.341 0.471  
West 0.203 0.196 0.279  
Midwest 0.278 0.285 0.184 
White 0.859 0.869 0.728 
Black 0.092 0.085 0.184
Other Race 0.049 0.046     0.088
Metropolitan statistical area 0.806 0.818 0.669
Health status 0.892 0.897   0.824  
Hypertension 0.262  0.265 0.221 
Activity limitations 0.318 0.314 0.360
Smoke 0.167   0.159 0.272    
Alcohol 0.056   0.047 0.169
Bmi 27.44 26.96 33.18
Exercise 0.479 0.493    0.309
Risk aversion 0.788 0.799   0.662  
Number of observations 1780 1644 136
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Table 3: Bivariate Probit Correlation Coeﬃcients
                 Dependent Variables        pho  p-value
Positive Expenditure/ Be Insured 2003 -0.5299     0.260       
Positive Expenditure/ Be Insured 2004  -0.9496        0.541       
Table 4: Cross-Sectional Bivariate Probit Estimation Coeﬃcients
(p-value in parentheses)
  Expenditure 2003 Be Insured 2003
intercept 0.9643   (0.282)
age 0.0168   (0.183) 0.0151  (0.014 )
male -0.9162  (0.000) -0.1509 ( 0.357)    
black -0.2153  (0.503) -0.5149 (0.018)
other_race -0.1419  (0.769) -0.3913 (0.190)
family size -0.2158  (0.011) 0.0514  (0.447 ) 
msa -0.1917  (0.529 ) 0.4337  (0.010)
northeast 0.2356   (0.482 ) 0.4700 (0.097 )
midwest 0.7171  ( 0.066) 0.0817 (0.676 )
west 1.0350  ( 0.025)      -0.3043 (0.123)
insured 2.0831  ( 0.010)
income 2.48e-06(0.608)  0.0000  (0.000)
employed -0.9426 (0.073)  0.2692 (0.169) 
education -0.1600 ( 0.685) 0.7078  (0.000)
married 0.0911   (0.749) 0.4618  (0.007)
need care 0.1413   (0.361) 
hypertension -0.0309  (0.922 ) 0.1954  (0.312)
activity limit. -0.0227  ( 0.945) 0.0006 (0.997)
risk aversion 0.2727  (0.125)
Note: sample size 890; statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 5: Cross-Sectional Bivariate Probit Estimation Coeﬃcients
(p-value in parentheses)
  Expenditure 2004 Be Insured 2004
intercept 1.5073 (0.090)  
age 0.0040  (0.716) 0.0177 (0.003)
male -1.064  (0.000) -0.0717 (0.655)
black -0.4799 (0.235) -0.4255 (0.068)
other_race -0.0838 (0.868) -0.3941 (0.176)
family size -0.2521 (0.005) 0.0495 (0.530)
msa -0.4831 (0.126) 0.3653 (0.027)
northeast -0.1615 (0.706) 0.4407 (0.094)
midwest  -0.3098 (0.702) 0.2263 (0.247)
west -0.3386 (0.288) -0.2170 (0.260)
insured 2.0491 (0.005)
income 8.62e-06 (0.045) 0.0000 (0.000)
employed -0.6465 (0.100) 0.0262 (0.892)
education -0.1996 (0.690) 0.5928 (0.002)
married 0.1268 (0.693) 0.3238 (0.074)
need care 0.2761 (0.059)
hypertension 0.6086 (0.150) 0.0780 (0.683)
activity limit. 0.2282 (0.516) 0.0733 (0.665)
risk aversion 0.2129 (0.208)
Note: sample size 890; statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 6: Pooled OLS Regression Results.
Risk Variable: Self-Assessed Health.
 Preidictor Variables Coefficients p-values
intercept 6.710288   0.000
age 0.0021 0.479
male -0.1328 0.111
married -0.0544 0.452
black -0.0849 0.505
other race 0.0123 0.932
education -0.4279 0.002
income -2.33e-06 0.078
employed -0.0418 0.671
premium -0.0000 0.004
expenditure 0.0001 0.000
activity limitations 0.2518 0.001
health -0.1613 0.162
risk aversion 0.1370 0.113
mills1 -2.2891 0.000
mills2 -1.1936 0.001
Note: sample size 1613; R2 = 0.4239; Adjusted R2 = 0.4185;
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 7: Pooled OLS Regression Results.
Risk Variable: Hypertension
 Preidictor Variables Coeff icients p-values
intercept 6.5331   0.000
age 0.004 0.887
male -0.1535 0.066
married -0.0442 0.541
black -0.1352 0.292
other race 0.0114 0.944
education -0.4367 0.001
income -2.09e-06 0.115
employed -0.0185 0.851
premium -0.0000 0.008
expenditure 0.0001 0.000
activity limitations 0.2405 0.001
hypertension 0.2514 0.002
risk aversion 0.1379 0.109
mills1 -2.1702 0.000
mills2 -1.0837 0.004
Note: sample size 1613; R2 =0.4265; Adjusted R2 = 0.4212;
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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Table 8: Pooled OLS Regression Results.
Risk Variable: Life-Style Indicators
 Preidictor Variables Coefficients p-values
intercept 6.3921  0.000
age 0.0034 0.260
male -0.1537 0.069
married -0.619 0.393
black -0.0529 0.680
other race 0.0507 0.752
education -0.4623 0.001
income -2.52e-06 0.058
employed -0.7782 0.436
premium -0.0000 0.006
expenditure 0.0001 0.000
activity limitations 0.2672 0.001
smoke 0.1384 0.137
obese 0.0393 0.570
alcohol -0.2403 0.118
exercise 0.1982 0.004
risk aversion 0.1458 0.091
mills1 -2.3287 0.000
mills2 -1.1903 0.001
Note: sample size 1613; R2 = 0.4277; Adjusted R2 = 0.4212;
statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
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